governance, political economy, institutional development and economic regulation

Posts tagged ‘gas’

Give Us Energy Mr. Putin

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(photo credit: http://www.smithsonianmag.com)

India has negligible resources of oil and gas in the context of our future needs and from the perspective of the currently available extraction technology. Oil markets are liquid and sufficiently deep not to worry about oil availability so long as one has the USD to purchase it with. Oil, gas and petroleum product imports account for around one half of our exports. This could be worrisome in an environment of export pessimism. But expectations of enhanced competitiveness do not align with such pessimism.

If 25% of our energy needs are to be met by gas-one of the cleanest fossil fuels- we will have to ramp up our gas imports. Today 10 GW of power capacity is stranded because of shortage of gas supply. Households still cook on wood, charcoal or kerosene because domestic gas supply is constrained by availability.

Gas, has a very shallow and illiquid international market. Whilst 67% of the oil produced is traded only 30% of the gas produced is traded internationally. The bulk of gas trades are settled by gas being piped to the customer. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) – the option to piped supply of gas- accounts for less than one third of total gas trade (exports).

India is poorly situated to avail of piped gas from Qatar, Iran, Turkmenistan,  Russia or Australia-who control more than 50% of world gas reserves. Sub-sea pipelines account for a marginal amount of gas trades across oceans due to the higher costs and associated technological challenges. The real option till 2025 is LNG import.

Enter Russia: President Putin could be the White Knight meeting India’s LNG demand. Of course selling gas to India is propitious. The post Ukraine sanctions are hurting Russia and it needs to have reliable, long term arrangements for selling gas and oil. India is not a party to the sanctions and it is in its self-interest to focus on energy as what it wants from Russia during the Modi-Putin talks in New Delhi this week.

Russia hasn’t exactly been sitting on its hands to counter the US sanctions. It has already mended fences with China with whom it has concluded oil and gas supply deal. More generally it is leaning towards China, as a natural partner, in the global clustering against the US led set of allies. It would like to induct Iran and India as partners in this grouping.

India is a marginal player in this “great game”. It would be a complete mistake to barter our acceptability to all sides by putting our eggs into one basket. If Australia-a close US ally, can depend on China to absorb its energy exports and keep its economy humming, there is little reason for India to choose between the Great Powers.

It is to our advantage that we have extraordinarily good relations with Japan and other East Asian allies of the US. A long term contract for Russian LNG can be used to swap Russian LNG cargos (meant for India) with LNG coming from Qatar to Japan, cutting transportation costs for both. This could become a trilateral arrangement between Russia-Japan and India once the sanctions get diluted.

Nuclear Energy is the second area where we badly need Russian help. India needs an additional 10 GW of Nuclear Power. The State Owned Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL), which is the monopoly operator of all civil Nuclear assets in India, has lobbied to ensure that the Nuclear Liability Act 2010 approved by the Indian Parliament exempts the “operator” from all risk and liability in the event of a nuclear incident and loads it instead on equipment suppliers and project developers. This has effectively ensured that no private Insurance company would be willing to bear the unlimited risk of a nuclear mishap and private Banks would not finance such a project.

The only players left in the field could be State Owned Corporations both Indian and Russian. A State Owned Indian General Insurance Corporation could provide the Insurance cover and a Russian State Owned Project Developer could build the plant. Implicitly the risk will devolve onto the Governments of India and Russia and Bank finance would view this as a Sovereign risk. Clearly this is not a commercially palatable deal but it can be the classic outcome of G2G cooperation, in the spirit of the Russo-India friendship, where Russia helps India out of a jam of its own making: Bangladesh liberation (1971) being one such.

Will sealing these two energy deals brown-off China and the US? Russia delights in browning-off the US in any case whilst its relationship with China is at best of “mutual transactional benefit”.

In the case of India, we are perpetual wafflers and fence sitters who hop from one transactional advantage to another. This is perfectly aligned with our relatively diminutive economic stature and pressing domestic concerns. No one expects different from us.

PM Modi has been warmly congratulatory about China’s economic and poverty reduction achievements. It would help if we were also more respectful of China’s international status, since China is so status conscious. But this is difficult, because we have a completely different political and social environment and a vastly different institutional architecture. Our unresolved border disputes add fat to the fire.

There is however no reason to blur mutual economic self-interest with ideological compatibility. It makes sense for India to use its growing markets to bind China more firmly to the India growth story much like China has done versus the US. It is false ego to be at pains to keep China out of South Asia, just to protect our “dominance” in the Region.

Regional dominance has to have economic underpinnings. China has the fire power. We don’t. Trying to wean our neighbours away from China can end up “immiserizing” India. More importantly why even try?

Regional trade and output enhancing strategies need to willy-nilly include India because of its size and central location. Assured access for Nepal and China to the Indian Ocean; for East Asia assured access via Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to Turkey, all serve to bind the economic interests of our neighbours with our own.

India has to boogie with the US, China and Russia, but openly recognize that in this group, we are the “little fish”. We can be a “large fish” but only in some other a small pond with shrinking water levels. The question is which pond serves our national interest better.

Our relationship with Russia has principally been of dependence for armaments and collaboration in diplomatic fora since we have no clashing international alignments. The defence cooperation is destined to transform into a commercial one since India is opening up to becoming a defence manufacturer rather than just an importer. Business interests will invest in India depending on the competitiveness of the opportunities available.

The energy link between Russia and India is about the only slender but substantive chain, which can bind state owned gas exporters in Russia and gas importers in India. It is time to forge this chain to retain the warm glow, older Russians still feel, when Raj Kapoor’s films are screened.

Gas and Power: shine a light please on “deals”.

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Elections are around the corner. Babus are petrified of taking decisions. But government is burning the midnight oil to grant “relief” to Reliance, Tata and Adanis to compensate for the poor planning and foresight of these companies under the guise of “protecting consumer interest”.

The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) decided in April 2013 that Tata and Adani (coal based mega power plants in Gujarat) should be permitted to rupture their agreement with Gujarat and Haryana to supply electric power. The reasoning was that the cost of imported Indonesian coal had increased more than could not have been foreseen. A dissenting order by a member; Mr. Jayaraman points out that nothing in the bidding document compelled these companies to bid a fixed tariff. They could have opted to bid a variable tariff, which would have passed through the changes in fuel cost; both increase and decrease. They choose not to do so and hence forfeit their commercial rights to come back for a tariff revision. Other bidders whom they outbid did opt for variable costs and possibly were outbid on these grounds. We will never know for sure since bid details are not publicly shared on the net which incidentally is bad procurement practice.

The argument of acting in consumer interest is even more farcical. It states that since the bid tariff is no longer commercially viable, sticking to it would force the developers to abandon the project. No mention here of the penalty the developers would have to pay if they were to quit. No mention either that NTPC could happily buy the projects, just as it bought the ENRON project or Delhi Metro took over the Reliance Delhi Airport metro line when it did not make expected profits or that the National Highway Authority may have to take over the Gurgaon Expressway. The CERC argument is that the new developer would in any case have to charge more to consumers so why not just do a deal with the existing developers, since the poor consumer would have to pay more in any case. Sounds familiar to us aam admis and aurats (AAA) a circular argument which suits everyone except us. If a “deal” is to be done non-competitively then let us do it with the public sector. At least the resultant earnings will accrue indirectly to the MOF

Allowing such retro tariff revisions in competitive bidding not only knocks the concept out of the window, it is rich future pickings for CAG, CVC and CBI. To dilute this possibility the favorite ploy of babus has become to kick the problem over to an irreproachable, external entity; in this case Deepak Parekh of HDFC, who is in danger of fast becoming the MMS of Indian Gas and Power. Deepak apparently has headed (we don’t really know since neither the Gujarat nor the Haryana Government websites tell us about this) a committee, mutually agreed between the developers and the procuring state governments, to work out what should be done. This report has been submitted to the CERC in mid-September 2013, but is not on the website of CERC and even worse has not been made available to PRAYAS a NGO specializing in energy and water, which is on the Advisory Board of the CERC. See their plaintive cry for information:  http://www.livemint.com/Industry/9NOJM6JwuwPwAw2i2l0DFP/CERC-suggested-to-hold-public-hearing-on-tariff-issues.html.

The implication us AAAs will draw is that had Mr. Jayaram not dissented, the CERC would have meekly passed through the additional cost to consumers. My Jayaraman, consequently, whilst not a whistle blower, since there is no allegation of graft, is certainly a rudder for the Rule of Law prevailing over egregious commercial considerations. In September 2013 Ministry of Power amended its tariff guidelines by making fuel cost a pass through. The term “pass through” is intriguing because it seems to undercut the powers of the CERC to determine tariff in a holistic manner. The new guidelines only require the power developer to be prudent while purchasing fuel. Fuel cost can constitute 50 to 70% of the tariff. Well known transfer pricing tricks, especially in imported fuel, militate against relying on a broad test of “prudence”, to protect consumer interest sufficiently.

A similar tactic has been adopted in gas production, where the price at which Reliance will sell its gas has doubled (by the cabinet this time) on the argument that the government administered price is far lower than the prevailing international price for gas. This being true does not explain why Reliance has failed to meet its investment commitments which are the prime reason for a decrease in gas production way below the optimum levels. Even worse, the Ministry of Petroleum’s view is falling on deaf ears that retro advantage of gas price increase should not be given to Reliance on prior production commitments. All this again in the interest of consumers, ofcourse, who in the absence of a deal with Reliance, would have to pay imported prices for gas! Admittedly, Reliance (like Enron) has the disadvantage of its public image working against it. Any babu ruling in Reliance’s favor, is automatically suspect in the eyes of us AAA’s though, mysteriously, very few babus who have the guts to do so, live to regret their decisions.

 As in the case of power, a committee headed by Mr. Kelkar, aided by the hapless and overworked Mr. Parekh is meanwhile looking at the gas pricing regime. Oddly, as in power, the entire exercise is being conducted in the cozy confines of the government, CII, an NGO which ostensibly works on fuel studies and research (but for which not a single paper comes up in a Google search) and the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), a consultancy. Presumably BCG was appointed after a competitive bid. We will never know because such trivia is never shared with us AAA’s. The entire oil exploration and production process is kept tightly under wraps. Exploration, development and production contracts are never made available on the website and “commercial confidentiality” conditions of the developer are routinely cited as a reason.

 The international literature on natural resource management is rife with the need to introduce transparency and citizen participation in this sector. The reason is obvious. Oil and gas contracts involve huge sums paid and received between private developers and government. If AAA’s are not kept informed of what were the obligations of the developer versus actual delivery on the one hand and what was owed to the government and what was actually received, the instant apprehension is potential leakage of government revenue or of motivated bias in favor of the developer. Compare our non-transparent and secret regime for the oil and gas production sector with what even Ghana puts on the web: http://www.gnpcghana.com/_upload/general/saltpondfield_sopcl.pdf. Key details of the contracts and delivery on commitments, including penalties levied for shortfalls in developer obligations. In 2012 the EU made it compulsory for all extractive industries (including oil and gas firms) to share data publiclly on revenue and payments to governments. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-541_en.htm.

The governments of India, Gujarat and Haryana all profess a commitment to “good governance”. The essence of good governance is to expand access to information for the public and to encourage their direct participation in decision making. True AAAs, like me, are clueless on technicalities like a Gas Production Sharing Contract but we sure like to be kept informed and we have technical experts who can work in our interest, independent of governments. Democracy is all about giving people a choice. Give us the information and let us use it the way we want to. Please don’t hide behind the shield of the RTI (which allows notional access to information) and force us AAA’s to seek hard copies of information from the relevant ministries. If the websites of governments have the space to trumpet their many achievements, surely they can also instantly share with us information on what contracts have been signed, with whom and the key obligations therein?

When you light a lamp, it illuminates everything around it. Please light a lamp in Indian power and gas deals. 

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