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Posts tagged ‘IAS’

Who rules Delhi?

Delhi throne

Khichdi – Risotto if you prefer the Italian version – is a traditional palliative for Delhi belly. But Delhi’s khichdi style political governance systems are guaranteed to give anybody the runs. So bad is the mess that it is difficult to find out who rules Delhi. The Delhi Government, a contender, appealed against orders of the Union Government to clarify its constitutional mandate.

Supreme Court clarifies the law

The Supreme Court, in its July 4, five judge bench, judgement, patiently re-explained the law, without venturing to drill down to the crux of the dispute between the Aam Admi Party (AAP) government and the BJP ruled Union government – who controls the public servants in the government of Delhi? The dispute closely resembles a Saas -Bahu quarrel – principally, who gets to jangle the house keys and run the house.

Judicial decisions unlikely to resolve political power stand-off

The AAP came to power by promising to the good but poor, people of Delhi, to set right the tyrannical, corrupt Delhi bureaucrats and other elites. The AAP found, to its dismay, that they had less real powers than the Municipal Commissioner of Mumbai. Being a glorified Municipal Commissioner was of no use in leveraging the AAP onto the national level and that too within months of coming to power. AAP chose the path of open, tactically public confrontation with the Union government in a David versus Goliath stand-off.

To be sure, the BJP run Union government’s intention were hardly kosher either. It tried to swat the AAP at every opportunity. The previous Lieutenant Governor (LG), Najeeb Jung – appointed by the Congress, called an end to his stressed innings in December 2016.

Will the Supreme Court verdict change things? India is peculiarly American in its belief that good laws and sound judgements can set things right. There is little evidence to support this belief. Laws, which are out of sync with reality and judgements which are legally correct but practically iffy are not the stuff that good governance is made of.

Expectations build reality. Delhi is often described as “closely resembling a State government”. Delhi is as much a state government as we are a “federal” country – another slipshod simplification used for the essentially unitary form of our polity albeit with some federal characteristics.

How it all began

Delhi government is a “special” child of the Indian National Congress, which was in power in the Delhi Metropolitan Council uninterruptedly from 1972 till 1990. In 1991 the INC decided to embellish their jagir with a totem of statehood- possibly to appease citizens with a magic bullet which would solve all their problems. In 1992 the 69th Amendment to the constitution – prescribed a special status for Delhi. It became a hybrid between a Union Territory, like Puducherry and a State government, like Goa.

But no matter how many new, white Toyota Innova’s Mr Kejriwal adds to his cavalcade, he will remain a Chief Minister in name only and Delhi’s Legislative Assembly a caricature of democracy. This is not because Mr Kejriwal or the legislators are wanting on merits. But the constitutional arrangements militate against them having a free hand in providing good governance.

Kejriwal

The proximate cause of the constitutional spat is that the Union government claims the Delhi government has no independent powers of managing their employees. It must do so only with the concurrence of the Union government. Municipalities face a similar constraint versus the State governments, which sit on their heads. The Supreme Court (SC) has not dealt explicitly with this critical issue. But reading between the lines, two implicit messages emerge.

SC judgement implies Delhi Government competent to legislate and execute on Public services

First, the SC has specifically stated that all matters in the State list, other than the three exempted subjects of Public order, Police and Land are within the legislative authority and hence also the executive authority of the Delhi government. State public services are one such subject at entry 41 of Schedule 7, List II of the State List of the constitution. A plain reading of the SC order indicates that this subject is within the mandate of the Delhi government.

But Delhi does not have its own cadre of IAS officers allocated to it or Provincial Service Officers appointed by it, unlike other states. It is staffed by IAS and DANICS (Delhi, Andaman and Nicobar Islands) officers, made available to it by the Union government, which is the cadre control authority.

Union government’s view on services too expansive

It is unclear where the Union government’s powers to manage these cadres end. Allocation of specific officers to Delhi, training, promotion and disciplinary action are powers intrinsic to cadre management. But must the Union government also approve their posting to or transfer from one position to another within the Delhi government? These are routine decisions which affect individual officers but do not impinge on cadre management.

LG only an “engaged watcher” on all matters except Public order, Police and Land

Second, the SC drew a useful distinction between the right of the LG to be informed of all decisions of the Delhi government and his specific power to reserve a matter for the orders of the President. It was careful to emphasise that the latter is to be used only in exceptional cases. This indicates that the Supreme Court veers towards a rational and harmonious sharing of personnel management powers between the Union and the Delhi government.

The sprawling Delhi bureaucracy prefers the Union government as “Mai-Bap”

A May 21, 2015 notification of the Union Home Ministry espoused the view that the Delhi government has no powers with respect to management of public services on the specious grounds that it has no public services or State Public Service Commission of their own.

The Union government’s unorthodox viewpoint draws support from the all-powerful IAS/DANICS cadre which fear loss of prime status, versus the uniformed services, if they are subjected to control of the Delhi government whilst the police remain directly managed by the Union government. The Delhi High Court will now rule on this sensitive issue.

Dharna

Delhi’s bloated administrative architecture wastes public money. It creates a clash of political egos and a surfeit of elected authorities all elbowing for space in just 700 square km of urban space. Delhi should revert to the 1956 arrangements – Union Territory with an Administrator overseeing the existing four civilian municipalities. But each must be headed by a directly elected Mayor. If the experiment works, India’s metros could finally join the world in participatory local governance.

India’s elite bureaucrats – unshakably resilient

 

Mughals

The great Mughals (16th to 18th century) found it more difficult to manage their extended zenanas than to conquer fractious Hindustani kingdoms. The insidious politicking and power struggles of the women in purdah are well known. Less well appreciated are the strength, stability and support that the zenana afforded to the emperor, as a secure haven of peace and a source of experienced, sound, well-meaning advice. Ira Mukhoty exquisitely documents this aspect of the zenana in her new book -Daughters of the Sun.

zenana

The IAS is the metaphorical “zenana” for leaders of modern India

What the zenana was to the Great Mughals, the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) is to our political leaders at the Centre and in the states. Curiously, even the numbers match. Both the IAS and Emperor Akbar’s zenana — the largest — are around 5000 strong.

The only difference is that, unlike the zenana, the IAS is predominantly male. But this is changing. Like the zenana it is recruited on merit through intense competition. Once recruited, a minimum basic standard of life and respect is assured. But progress onto meaningful positions of power depends on both merit and political convenience. Bad political choices can end careers prematurely. Good ones can lead to a rapid rise.

IAS

Expectedly, disruptions to the existing architecture initiated by the emperor caused great trauma then, with fervent attempts made to subvert the change, as now. Not all disruptions end well either. But that is no argument for not trying to imbue knowledge competition into the workplace, as the Narendra Modi government proposes via the lateral entry of 10 joint secretaries.

Why change?

Modern workplaces have specific needs. Of these, IAS officers have only two characteristics which others may lack. First, they are the culled outcome of the UPSC exam which selects just 0.1 per cent of those who apply. This ensures that genetically they have the required level of raw intellect. Second, they have an accelerated and time-bound promotion career path. This ensures that they will always be ahead of those in other cadres. Even seniority, within a cohort of officers, is based on their score in the UPSC exam and the Mussoorie training academy. These embedded entitlements bestow upon an IAS officer ritual status, attracts respect, and often abject compliance. But an impartial, permanent civil service, as a source for leadership level advice, is an anachronism, for three reasons.

The IAS has no “skin in the game”

First, politicians today need bureaucratic advisers who have “skin in the game” — they prosper with a politician — zenana style — and go down with the politician they support. The need for “trust” and “faith” in the support senior staff around a minister is poorly aligned with the old civil service architecture of impartiality, seniority and permanence.

Quick to learn, but no deep personal knowledge or insight

Second, the explosive force of the knowledge economy and the range of new sovereign interventions call for total immersion for extended periods in a chosen area of work. This is alien to the way the IAS is managed and trained for general management purposes. To head an engineering department, it is not enough to have an engineering degree before joining the IAS. Most useful skills are non-academic and acquired on the job. Only a practising engineer can credibly navigate a politician through the likely cost-benefit of options. Our achievements in space technology, missiles and atomic energy are out of sync with the quality of our roads or public medical care. Both of the latter work areas are managed by an IAS officer at the top. And it shows.

Deep skills do not come cheap, nor do they remain captive

Urjit

Third, skilled help does not come cheap. The pervasive private sector provides the demand for top-level skills where the government can never hope to compete for talent. Only saints would give up private sector options and choose to work in the government, except for short periods, such as to round off one’s CV, enlarge networks and gain face time at the leadership levels. Facilitating short-term contracts in the government for skilled professionals is a good way of achieving the required skill infusion into the administration.

Short term hires should come and go with the government

Expectedly, the contractual top-level hires will be selected only where both ideologies and objectives match. This makes sense for both sides. The entrants and the government know that without an inside track with the political leadership, they would simply run out of time before achieving anything. In public policy, academic credentials have to burnish with zenana brownie points like loyalty and a complete alignment of objectives.

What does short term hire mean for the reservation policy?

Mayawati

This flags BSP supremo Bhen Mayawati’s concern of how to ensure that brilliant Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates do get a fair chance. At present, there is no caste quota for promotions in the Government of India for the elite services. The quota applies only at the time of recruitment. Currently, only two per cent of all joint secretary-level positions have been advertised for lateral entry. But in future, if lateral entries increase to, say, 25 per cent of all positions, the caste quota issue will need to be managed head on.

UPSC selection is not aligned with the hiring practices for short term experts 

Would the UPSC be a safer choice than an in-house government selection committee? Not necessarily. We have seen in the case of the appointment of judges, compromised selection is not the preserve of the government alone. But there should be a permanent selection committee comprising the secretary of the requesting department; two private sector or NGO subject specialists, and the secretaries of the UPSC and the department of personnel and training.

But safeguards to ensure merit and transparency must be built into the process

Lastly, the process adopted for lateral contractual positions must be differentiated from the existing process for internal appointments. Advertisements for contractual positions must specify the required mix of minimum educational requirements and particular work experience, along with the exact job description. Transfer from one specific position to another, during the contract, must not be allowed, to avoid gaming and to protect the incumbent.

Alas, has this come too late?

time

The Narendra Modi government’s move to open the doors for external, top-level skills is extremely welcome. But, as in the case of Air India’s disinvestment, its timing, at the fag end of the government’s tenure, loads the dice against persons of outstanding talent applying for this opportunity. Even the best house help is risk averse and abhors untimely disruptions.

Adapted from the authors opinion piece in The Asian Age, June 18, 2018 http://www.asianage.com/opinion/oped/180618/govts-lateral-hiring-great-idea-bad-timing.html

The tax collectors’ revolt

ITax

Last week’s “revolt” by senior income tax officers, meeting in Mumbai, against alleged micro management by the Union Revenue Secretary is unlikely to bother the average citizen. If anything, citizens would welcome glitches in tax collection behind which they can hide.

Mind the growing gap

But the revolt deserves attention because it illustrates a growing gap between officers and the political leadership. A similar gap resulted, earlier in 2015, in the extended and emotive agitation by army pensioners, for implementing the principle of One Rank One Pension (OROP). They and serving officers believed that it was a just demand being scuttled by the civil bureaucracy which acts as a gate keeper between the army and the political leadership. The revolt of the tax collectors is the second time that short circuited wires, between the political leadership and field level officers, are being exposed.

Bad strategy but genuine angst

The instrument chosen, by the tax officers, to voice their concerns via a resolution is questionable in terms of its efficacy as is the selection of the flash point for making their case. Unlike the army, income tax officers are no ones’ favourite person. The income tax department is, unfortunately, generally perceived as being self-serving and uncaring of citizen rights. Consequently, an upsurge of public sentiment in their support, as was the case for OROP, is unlikely. More likely, citizens would advocate even harsher disciplinary measures to pull up the department. Collecting tax is a thankless job.

The choice of flash point is similarly questionable — the transfer of a tax officer who allegedly adopted unfair means to boost his end-of-year performance. He issued a huge tax demand on a public sector bank just prior to the annual deadline and then allowed a refund of most of the tax amount immediately thereafter — a cynical “win-win” strategy for both the officer and the bank.

No one could possibly defend the officer’s use of “temporary tax terrorism” tactics. But the summary manner in which he was “punished” by being transferred (not officially a punishment), on the intervention of the Revenue Secretary, seems to have rankled. It does not help matters that the Revenue Secretary is traditionally from the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) but exercises oversight over the functioning of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) under which around 8000 Indian Revenue Service (IRS) officers work. Incidentally there are seven senior officers of the IRS in the CBDT — the apex body for exercising operational control over direct tax administration. But none of them can ever break through the glass ceiling prescribed for them of the rank of a Special Secretary. This is lower than that of the Revenue Secretary, though they get the same pay.

Only empowered agencies perform

In India, we have not developed a culture of equality between field agencies and the secretariat. It is only in the armed forces that the correct equation between the secretariat and the field agency is maintained. This is visible during the republic day celebrations. In the line up to greet the President, the Vice President and the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary stands lower down than the three service chiefs of the army, the air force and the navy. This is how it should be for all field level entities of the government. The officer in the secretariat must never be the person perceived to be in charge of the field level operations. Maintaining the principle of unity of command and responsibility is a pre-condition for efficient functioning within an agency.

Towards a more nerdy Secretariat  

nerd

The job of the secretariat is to assist the Minister in parliamentary work. It is perverse to adorn secretariat positions with high level administrative powers. The nuts and bolts of administration must be outsourced to the concerned agencies created specifically for the purpose. The role of the secretariat must shrink. The example of Minister for Railways, Suresh Prabhu, is worth emulating. One of the first things he did, on assuming charge, was to delegate away most of the operational powers, centralized in his office, to the Regional General Managers. A secretariat officer enhances value, not by banging people on their heads, but by skillfully using an insider’s appreciation of the operating environment and superior analytic skills to facilitate the functioning of field agencies. Making officers in field agencies perform better is squarely the job of the head of the concerned agency.

In a more evolved work environment, the secretariat is where policy and legislation is formulated. The field agency is where programmes are fleshed out and operations monitored for results. The relationship between the two must not be hierarchical as it inevitably is today. Policy formulation and programme implementation are two entirely different albeit symbiotic specialisations. There must be give and take between the two. One way of ensuring this is to make the heads of both the secretariat and the field agency of equal rank. Indeed, this is one way a Minister — who often might not be well acquainted with her charge — gets a rounded perspective of the issue at hand.

The bottom line is that, whilst the Mumbai IRS officers have chosen their battle badly, their cause, as indeed the cause of all other specialised government agencies and cadres, needs deeper consideration.

We should be moving over to a new governance architecture which values specialisation and extends equal opportunities to all cadres, particularly those which already exist in the Union government. IAS officers, unlike officers from the IRS, are on deputation from the state government cadres to the Union government. The IRS is a home grown, central government cadre. The logic for not letting the IRS manage its own house is questionable. Inserting an IAS officer between the political leadership and the IRS seems an archaic and inefficient way of managing the vital tax function.

The manner in which a majority of the senior positions in the Union government are “reserved” for the IAS is archaic because it does not recognise the heightened role for specialisation in modern administration. Law, Tax, Public Finance, Infrastructure, Human Development, Industry and Trade, Natural Resource Management, Defence, Security and Intelligence are all stand-alone disciplines in which practitioners spend their entire working lives. It is inconceivable that value can be added in policy formulation; program conceptualisation or project implementation, without the relevant experience and skill.

Lift the glass ceiling for specialized central services

Inflection points are always graphically depicted by glass ceilings getting smashed. Institutional wisdom lies in removing glass ceilings as soon as they develop cracks and well before they are smashed by the force of change.

smash

 

Sarkari pay: Too much love

A picture is worth a thousand words. Even the Oxford dictionary has conceded as much by admitting the emoji “tears of joy” as the first ever “pic-ord” which sums up the prevailing worldwide emotion of relief at even small mercies.

emoji-tears_3502911b

This emoji must have resonated with the 10 million employees and pensioners of the Union government as they read the generally beneficent recommendations of the Seventh Pay Commission presented to Union finance minister Arun Jaitley this week.

 

Coming as it does against the disturbing backdrop of faujis (Army veterans) having to resort to public agitations to get their due, the commission’s key objective seems to have been to soothe jangled sarkari nerves by adopting equity as the leitmotif of its recommendations.

 

Even recommending erosion of the pay “edge” enjoyed by the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) by making it available to all other Group A services, fits in well with this axiom. It mollifies the other cadres whilst giving ample opportunity to the IAS to retain its predominance by other means. After all they are the ones who write the rules today.

 Equity – yes! but for whom?

But equity is an expansive concept spanning generations. How equitable, for example, are the recommendations versus citizens? Citizens have never been considered “stakeholders” by any of the commissions till now.

 

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, however, has different ideas. He wants IAS officers to go beyond the files and the political intermediaries who crowd around key government employees and to consult directly with people to know the truth. Incidentally, this was why district collectors in earlier times went on extensive tours and camped in villages. One wishes that the Commission had also followed this practice of consulting the intended beneficiaries of public services, instead of limiting consultations to only government employees.

Fiscal impact to crowd out public investment, as usual 

The Commission assesses the direct fiscal impact of its recommendations at `1 lakh crore ($15.5 billion) per year on pay, allowances and pension for 10 million employees and pensioners. The unassessed indirect impact will be at least thrice this amount, since the ripple effect raises all public sector employees’ wages in state and local governments and those in the state-owned enterprises who number 12 million, excluding pensioners.

 

The question that 220 million households — comprising the rest of India who do not partake of this public bounty — are likely to ask is why should each of them pay an additional `4,500 every year to finance this splurge?

Income Tax

Government pay is already indexed 100 per cent to inflation and pension is similarly indexed substantially. Any increase in the “real” pay — after accounting for inflation — needs to be justified against additional or better work performed. There is no evidence of any such link compelling the proposed enhancements.

 

Most importantly, the additional burden is ill-timed. It is mere statistical jugglery to justify the fiscal burden (0.65 per cent of GDP) by pleading that it is less than the burden (0.77 per cent of GDP) imposed by the preceding Sixth Pay Commission a decade ago. Another argument is that the prospects for economic growth are bright, making the additional burden manageable. This is iffy reasoning.

 

The fiscal challenges faced by the government today are far more daunting than in 2009, when there were expectations of a quick rebound in world economic growth. Consider that the aggregate, cumulative loss of state electricity boards alone is around `3 lakh crores ($45.5 billion) which needs to be dealt with to improve electricity supply. Union minister of state for power, coal, new and renewable energy Piyush Goyal has taken a hard stand against the Union government bearing the burden without basic reform within these entities. This is the right way to go. If subsidies for the poor need to be narrowly targeted, so must “real” public sector salary enhancements, and that too only to reward the few performers in the vast government machinery and not spread equitably like largesse to all.

Link public pay enhancement to higher than targeted GDP growth 

Given this background prudence dictates that even if the recommendations are accepted in-principle, actual accrual and pay out of these amounts should be graduated. An option to link pay enhancements with performance is to link their payout to GDP growth which is a specific, measurable, assignable, realistic, time-related specific, measurable, assignable, realistic, time-related (SMART) metric for aggregate government performance.

 

One obvious option is to use the existing proportion of emoluments to GDP of 2.77 per cent. This can be thought of as the “share” of Union government employees in GDP. A similar share can be justified for distribution of the recommended pay enhancements out of the actual additional value created above the GDP growth target.

 

Using this principle, for every 0.5 per cent of growth above the target (say 7.5 per cent instead of 7 per cent), the amount available in that year would be around `30,000 crore. This is less than one third of the assessed fiscal impact of the Commission’s recommendations. Once sufficient “additional” growth has been achieved — say over the next three years — the recommendations can kick in. Alternatively the implementation can be staggered annually. This forces government to perform before increasing the “real” pay of its employees. From the citizens’ point of view this is akin to hiring an auto rickshaw. You only pay after the driver has brought you to your destination — not in advance.

ice cream

No ice cream without results

There is more evidence of excessive generosity. An assured annual increment of 3 per cent seems too generous for an inflation-indexed salary even though it is calculated only on the basic pay. Unearned annual increments should not be more than 1 per cent at best.

Fauji “pension edge” levelled yet again

The concern with equity has driven the commission to extend the principle of One Rank One Pension — granted by the government to the armed forces just prior to the submission of the Commission’s report — to civilians also. This is akin to compounding an earlier mistake. Levelling the armed forces’ and civilian pensions means taking away the “pension edge” which was so tenaciously fought for and won by the armed forces. The downside is that it may spark off a second round of fauji gussa (anger).

veterans

The Commission has done stellar work in sharing employee demographics for the first time. It has also laboriously listed an incredible 196 different allowances and worked meticulously to simplify and rationalise them by recommending termination of 52 and clubbing 36 others into other allowances. That still leaves 108 allowances to be dealt with later. The government would do well to heed the advice that fuller and more transparent budgeting of allowances is necessary.

 

But pay commissions, despite their expansive mandates, are not really expected to create a new architecture for public service. Their job is to shut the maximum number of mouths with the least amount of cash. The Justice Mathur Commission could have done worse. Thank God for small mercies!

7th PC

Adapted from the authors article in the Asian Age November 22, 2015  http://www.asianage.com/columnists/it-s-rip-127

 

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