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Posts tagged ‘Sri Lanka’

Naga rebels are also Indian

Rijiju

(photo credit: northeastnews.in)

Bloodletting always makes good copy. No wonder then that the killing, by Naga rebels, of 18 unarmed Army jawans going on leave in Manipur on June 5 and the airborne counter-strike on June 9 by Indian troops on rebel camps in Myanmar, stirred public sentiment. The depth, the speed and the effectiveness of the Army response was breathtakingly efficient, and reflects the capabilities of our Army when it is effectively led.

But the “cheer-leader” type response of the young minister of state for information and broadcasting — Colonel Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore, himself an ex-Armyman, using Twitter handles to extend dire warnings that Indians will root out terrorists who attack India or Indians anywhere, was reminiscent of President George W. Bush’s forceful “Marlboro Man” resolve to “hunt down” the Al Qaeda perpetrators of 9/11.

Col. Rathore forgets that President Bush was targeting enemy aliens who had wreaked havoc on American soil. Naga rebels are as Indian as the minister — historically disgruntled though they may be. Surely the optics of managing our own rebels has to be different from the manner in which foreign enemies are dealt with.

Col. Rathore will rue his remarks should he, one day, become minister in-charge of the Northeast — as his more illustrious colleague Gen. V.K. Singh (retd) is today. Negotiating with “rebels” you wanted to once hunt down becomes unnecessarily more awkward and difficult.

Alternatively, Col. Rathore could, in future, become minister in the external affairs ministry where he will rue a hawkish image whilst dealing with our immediate neighbours. The friendly government of Myanmar ostensibly only came to know about India’s targeted penetration into their territory, after the airborne Indian Force had returned — a mirror image of the US strike to hunt down Osama bin Laden in Pakistan.

No government likes its sovereignty to be taken lightly, least of all our immediate neighbours in South Asia, who already bristle at our “big bully but empty pockets” image. China is also a big bully, but at least they shut the protesting mouth with cash.

The point Col. Rathore should consider is that he is not mandated to speak on matters outside his portfolio. He may have personal opinions. As an ex-Armyman it would be natural to glow with professional pride at the faultless manner in which the operation was executed.

But the code on tweeting personal opinions by ministers was established in 2009. Shashi Tharoor, a junior minister in the previous government, got a rap from his party for tweeting jocularly that he was willing to travel “cattle class” or economy on government work in solidarity with all our “Holy Cows” — a particularly evocative term for the “secular”, very politically correct optics code of the Congress.

India’s very professional armed forces, like all professional soldiers worldwide, are the first to acknowledge that violence, even when it is justified and used by the state legally, is at best a necessary evil to deal with those who do not respect the rules of law. The Army is a highly honed, surgical knife, effective only when used for the shortest period to maximum effect. Violating this key axiom for their deployment results in rapid degradation of their effectiveness. This is what happens when the Army is used for extended periods to ensure internal security as in Northeast.

India has made enormous strides on the diplomatic front by establishing a functional relationship with the government in Myanmar. No trivial task given the political contradictions within Myanmar. The nascent democratic architecture; our ambivalent competition with China — intent on using Myanmar as an overland route to the Indian Ocean area; India and Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi’s subdued take on the human rights of the marginalised Rohingya Muslim community — all add to the complexity of Indo-Myanmar relations.

But it is on the domestic front in Nagaland and Manipur that the deficiencies are more extreme. As in Kashmir and in the Maoist-affected eastern districts, the incentive for local citizens, including rebels to end the conflict is less than self-evident.

It does not help when local administrations are elitist, historically weak, inefficient and often corrupt as in Nagaland and Manipur.

The jury is out on whether democracy helps or hinders this process of stabilisation in conflict situations. It is entirely possible that a strong authoritarian government, with deep pockets can “crush” rebellion temporarily. This is the expectation in China. But it is yet to happen in Tibet or in Xinjiang.

Unless the root causes of marginalisation are addressed and the incentive to conform to the rule of law becomes greater than the incentive to rebel, sustained stabilisation is unlikely. In any case, India is committed to working within the democratic framework. Both Nagaland and Manipur have elected governments, as in Kashmir and they have to be supported to take control. Emerging from conflict into peace is a complex societal process.

The good news is ordinary people in war-torn areas are usually unequivocal about their desire for peace. Padma Rao Sundarji’s Sri Lanka: The New Country presents this alternative view that local Tamil Sri Lankans, in sharp contradiction to the jingoistic sentiments of overseas Tamils, are happy that the domestic war in Sri Lanka has ended. All “armies”, including ones own, are extractive in character and feed off the local population, which suffers the economic cost, the indignities and the atrocities of conflict.

Rebels living comfortably abroad sheltered and assisted by “friendly” foreign governments and their agents never truly represent the ordinary citizen in the conflict zone. The recent incidents in Manipur are surely not the last round in the battle of attrition, ongoing since 1952, between the Indian state and the Naga rebels.

The real question is whether we are doing enough to innovate a domestic political solution? Can Team Modi build the process of reconciliation on the aspirations of educated, young Nagas? Are there more Kiren Rijiju’s (junior minister for home who is from Arunachal Pradesh) out there?

Adapted from the Asian Age June 12, 2015: http://www.asianage.com/columnists/innovate-move-conflict-peace-902

Well run, PM Modi

modi run

(photo credit: http://www.iosipa.com)

Reposted from the Asian Age May 25. 2015 < http://www.asianage.com/columnists/well-run-modi-690>

Should it worry us that Modi sarkar resembles the Ethiopian Haile Gebrselassie, the greatest long-distance runner ever and not Usain Bolt, the 100-metre thunderbolt from Jamaica?

Not really. The 100-metre dash, whilst spectacular and crowd pulling, is a good tactic for disaster mitigation but disastrous for managing a huge, diversified economy. The marathon analogy suits India better. It is a test of endurance, grit and determination. Outcomes are only visible towards the end of the 42 km race. Those in the lead for the first eight km rarely end up winning.

Other than physical fitness the marathon runner needs a disciplined mind, which restrains the urge to sprint till the last mile whilst maintaining a planned and steady pace all through. Also important is the ability to transcend the near continuous pain and stress, and remain focused on the goal.

Modi sarkar has expectedly followed the epic Bollywood masala — a marathon interspersed with sprints. Citizens have been kept entertained by a blitzkrieg of short-term Bolt spirits to simulate inclusive ascent on a rising elevator of well being, whilst working steadily behind the scenes towards medium-term goals.

The opening of 80 million small bank accounts; the launch of three social protection (pension and insurance) schemes; the attractively packaged, near weekly engagements with foreign governments on their soil and ours; pushing through the border realignment with Bangladesh; the quietening down of tension with China in Arunachal Pradesh; the relatively incident-free border with Pakistan; the warming relationship with Sri Lanka; the race to make India “cough-free” by substituting clean renewables with dirty fossil fuels; the quick response to natural disaster in Nepal and Bihar; the disciplining of the bureaucracy and the Bharatiya Janata Party’s political cadres; effective management of the sensitive relationship between the BJP and its regressive cultural font — the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh; the visible dominance of the Prime Minister’s Office, which had wilted under the previous government; the productive alignments with Didi’s (Mamata Banerjee) government in West Bengal; Mufti Muhammad Sayeed’s People’s Democratic Party in Kashmir; the Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh; Amma (J. Jayalalithaa) in Tamil Nadu, are all signals of aggressive political outreach.

But behind the scenes, several half-marathons have also been initiated — the blistering pace of tendering and award of infrastructure projects with results expected over the next three years; the quick decisions on defence procurements; the swift auction of coal mines to resolve the fuel supply bottlenecks; the opening up of the defence sector to private investment and management; relaxation of foreign direct investment constraints in insurance — both major sources of good jobs and the quiet continuation of the previous government’s Aadhaar electronic platform as a primary mechanism for verifying identity so necessary for subsidy reform via direct cash transfers.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has run the first leg of the marathon with exceptional skill. But this was the easy part. The next 16 km till 2017 is what will make or break his chances for re-election in 2019. Five key measures stand out.

First, with two big state-level elections coming up, the BJP will need to marry the compulsion for populism with fiscal rectitude, which has been the leitmotif of the first year of Arun Jaitley as the finance minister of India. Reigning in inflation is a continuous struggle in such circumstances. It is fitting that the Reserve Bank of India continues to focus on managing money supply and interest rates. The ministry of finance will have its hands full substituting for the erstwhile Planning Commission in allocation of funds and enhancing real-time, expenditure management systems and metrics to ensure “value for money” spent. Key indicators to watch will be achievement of the targeted reductions in revenue, current account and fiscal deficits.

Second, introduce a poverty and private jobs creation filter. Share the assessments publicly via a “dashboard” of proposed allocations to make the allocation process more transparent and participative. Direct democracy is of Mr Modi’s signature tune. This is also a great way of self-restraining crony capitalism and populism.

Third, cut loose the railways and the public sector companies and banks from the crippling constraints of ministerial intervention. Corporatise all production and service delivery entities as a first step to reform, followed by administrative autonomy and selective listing of stock. The creeping tendency, reminiscent of the “Indira Gandhi ‘commanding heights’ syndrome”, of falling back on the public sector for getting quick results is unfortunate. The international experience shows that poor investments are the outcome if public funds are plentiful. India cannot afford “bridges to nowhere”, even if they create jobs in the short term. This implies fixing the “broken” public-private partnership (PPP) model, not effectively junking it altogether with the government assuming all the risk, as is being considered currently.

Fourth, trim the flabby Union government. The UK model of agencification and administrative reform, tight budget constraints, monetisation of assets and the levy of user charges, fits the Indian context best. Look for “asymmetric reform”, rather than whole-of-government approaches. The Aadhaar unique ID experiment is a useful example of the benefits of strategic, but narrow reform. The “Namami Gange” Clean Ganga Mission is another example. If “cooperative federalism” is to be more than just an attractive slogan the Union government must be the pied-piper, which the state governments follow.

Fifth, fix the big institutional constraints to rapid development. The last thing we need is a clash of titans — Rajya Sabha versus the government — a replay of the dysfunctionality of the American political architecture; judiciary versus the executive. Are we really keen to tread the Pakistan route? Avoid proxy veto by the Union governors over elected state governments — a throwback to the ugly days of the Emergency in the 1970s. Implement the 74th Amendment (1992), which mandates decentralisation but remains ignored two decades later.

The final 16-km dash in 2018 and 2019 will be easy if the half marathons already initiated are run well, over the next two years. The trick is not to sacrifice public interest in an all-out attempt to win state elections in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The question remains: will the BJP’s marathon mind rule or its sprinter’s muscles dominate?

Netaji-Mulayam’s 30/30 India (U) Vision

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Blame it on Nehru. If it had not been for him, India (U-ndivided) would comprise Pakistan, Azad Kashmir and Bangladesh, though regrettably still not Sri Lanka (Galle and Kandulama are so beautiful!).

Now why couldn’t the man have just made Jinnah the PM, who would have been gone soon enough, anyway. Nehru would have been back in the saddle and the rest of history would have unwound as it did, except:

(1) We would have won more hockey matches.

(2) Our cricket and football teams would be stronger.

(3) Our movie stars would be taller and better looking and Imran Khan would be ours.

(4) Indians (U) would no longer feel compelled to cheer cricket teams on the basis of religion.

(5) The delights of Lahore would still be available to the average Punjabi

(6) We would not have the absurd feet stomping, yelling, in-your-face antics between border guards, every day at Attari.

(7) The refined Dilli culture would not have been overwhelmed by exuberant Punjabi refugees.

(8) Bengali would have been a dominant Indian language spoken by 15% and Urdu would never have declined and be spoken by more than 25% of U-Indians.

(9) India (U)’s river water potential would have been better harnessed

(10) Hydro power would still be a major energy source

(11) Cheap gas, piped from Turkmenistan would fuel household energy needs, industry and electricity in the North

(12) Our forest cover ratio would be much worse but our freshwater availability would increase significantly.

(13) The Soviets would still be there in Afghanistan because we would never have given the US a toehold in Karachi, the Panjab or the NW Frontier areas

(14) The Taliban would never have been born, nor would have Bhindranwale.

(15) India (U) would not be a favourite tourist destination for Israeli backpackers.

(16) We would still get cheap Sardas (a juicy, sugary sweet Afghanistan/NW Frontier melon) and exquisite dry fruit.

(17) We would still have to deal with “Afghani” money lenders and their wayward ways of dealing with defaulters rather than having them live here as pliant refugees.

(18) We would be able to visit Kashmir without bullet proof vests and enjoy its cuisine and natural beauty.

(19) Kashmiris would still opt for business, horticulture, hospitality, handicrafts, poetry and cricket rather than AK 47s and football.

(20) North and East India (U) would have remained competitive versus the West and the South with easy access to the sea via Karachi; undiluted Punjabi prowess in agriculture; Sindhi excellence in trade; Bengali competitiveness in “Kolture”, arts, law and the social sciences.

(21) We would have fathered micro credit and Muhammad Yunus would be ours.

(22) With one third of the electorate and dominance in the North, Muslims would no longer feel like a minority

(23) Under competition from a significant Islamic presence, Hinduism would have tended to consolidate, rather than splinter along caste cleavages, as it has today.

(24) The BJP would have been a dominant party of the right from the 1950s and Zardari and Sheikh Hasina would have been its Muslim leaders today instead of Shahnawaz Hussain.

(25) Nawaz Sharif and Khaleeda Zia would be the Muslim leaders of the Congress party, rather than Khurshid, Kidwai and Rasheed Alvi.(26) We would not spend 20% of our fiscal resources on the army.

(27) It is unlikely, Sikkim would ever have resolved to join the Republic, just as Nepal’s main regret is that it borders tumultuous India, rather than placid Sweden.

(28) China would be even more worried and hence more of an existential threat.

(29) The US would have been become friendlier much earlier.

(30) Najeeb Jung would still be Lt. Governor of Delhi

Sending Hamlet to Lanka

 

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India is caught in the quintessential indecisiveness of the fictional, Danish, Prince Hamlet, created by Shakespeare, who agonizes over “to be or not to be”, loosely applied here as “to go or not to go”, to the forthcoming Commonwealth meet in Sri Lanka.

Apparently, at issue is only how to deal with the outraged Tamil sentiment, should the government decide to participate, since this could undercut support for the Congress, amongst Tamil Nadu Members of Parliament, post the 2014 elections.

That the Sri Lankan army butchered their Tamils, both those heavily armed and the unarmed innocent, is clear. However, this is really no different from what is happening in Syria and what occurs in every place, where citizens decide to take up arms against the State.

The fundamental basis of the State, is its monopoly over violence. The manner in which violence is used, reflects the character of the State. In developed democracies, State violence is only permitted if aligned to the principles of the Rule of Law. For example, the State’s right to take away a citizens rights, liberty or life, is constrained by the legal requirement to follow the process of law. In pure forms of autocracy and monarchy, it is the ruler who has the power over life, death and taxes. Less developed democracies, like ours, fall somewhere in between. We allow the police and army to give the go-by to the rule of law, in areas of extreme civil unrest as in the North East in the 1970s to 1980s and Punjab, in the 1980s. Some, like Kashmir and the Maoist tribal belt in Eastern India continue to be endemic areas of conflict.

We are being hypocritical, if we are willing to suppress violent, domestic unrest, with a strong hand, but pretend to be squeamish about the manner in which Sri Lanka dealt with the Tamils.

No one can condone the killing of civilians by the State anywhere, but it does happen in poorly governed States. Once the personal, social and economic cost of taking up arms is lower for a citizen, than the benefits of remaining pliant to an oppressive regime, it becomes “rational” to revolt. Civilian deaths are collateral damage for the ensuing war to impose the supremacy of the State.

Mahatma Gandhi of course had the perfect, albeit difficult, strategy for citizens to deal with coercive regimes. Negotiate with the regime to make life incrementally better for citizens. Draw red lines, beyond which you will not be pushed. Oppose the regime thereafter, not by force, but through “Satyagraha” (passive resistance). By behaving thus, citizens retain the moral high ground. This moral high ground was not maintained by citizens in Sri Lanka, as it was not in Punjab and has not been in Syria, Kashmir and Maoist East India. By losing the moral high ground, citizens descend to the level of warriors and the rule of war replaces the rule of law.

Tamil Indians understandably feel compelled to highlight the ruthlessness of the conflict. But is it not better to focus on what India can do next, to mainstream the Sri Lanka Tamils,  rather than merely lament the past.

India has itself wisely used an entire gambit of measures, including special financial support, positive discrimination and political consensus, to pull the Seven Sisters (seven Indian States in the North East) into the national mainstream. Of course, it also helps that we are a genuine democracy. Hospitality, high-end retail outlets and private nursing services in metropolitan India are invariably manned by in-migrants from the North East. Sikkim, the most recent entrant to the Republic (1975), is poised to become a global, organic, tourism hot spot.

Dr. Singh, our Prime Minister, outlined his principles of “Panchsheel” yesterday, to include value based, enlightened self-interest, but usefully, left unclear, what our “values” are. But surely, we should apply the same value system to assess governance standards in foreign governments, as we use to rule our own citizens. By these standards, Sri Lanka is unexceptionally unfortunate in having treated its citizens shabbily, but they are no exception.

Perhaps our values are identity specific. Perhaps we view shabby treatment, by foreign governments, of their citizens of Indian origin, more severely. This is an entirely reasonable approach and consistent with our anti-apartheid stand in South Africa. But this is not a State visit by the Indian PM to Sri Lanka which could be interpreted to mean India condoning the killings. The choice of venue for the CHOGAM is incidental.

It is all very well for Tamil Nadu politicos to play to their gallery but that is about as much traction, as there is, for the “not to go” groupies in India. If we can shake hands with Pakistan, over the blood of our soldiers, in the larger interest of regional security, surely we can be one of the many Commonwealth members in Colombo, nudging Sri Lankan towards Tamil integration.

India has been extremely pragmatic and successful in dealing with internal rebellion, albeit at significant cost to the unfortunate individuals caught in the ensuing war. Rapid growth, with equity, along with the hope of transition to democratic governance, is our medium term solution for dealing with domestic disaffection. We should sell this model to Sri Lanka. It is time for the PM to fill-in his travel request for Lanka.  

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