governance, political economy, institutional development and economic regulation

Posts tagged ‘Sunni Terror’

Will the Indian “Malalas” please stand up

saarah-ahmed-indian-pilot-8-march-15-513x239

Photo: Sarah Ahmed: Indian. Pilot.

July 4, 1995 — America’s Independence Day — Islamist militants take six tourists hostage in Kashmir. They decapitate a Norwegian and kill the rest, including two Americans. There has been no letup in the orgy of violence since. But now Islamists — Sunni and Shia militants — are eliminating each other in West Asia. Glee that the “enemy” is disintegrating is inevitable in both Christian and Hindu right-wing camps. But as Prime Minister Narendra Modi has repeatedly stated, albeit with scarce substantive effect, terror has no loyalties beyond the willingness to kill and maim.

The political economy of terror

Islamic terror, like terror anywhere, comes heavily loaded with political and economic objectives. The Taliban was created by the US to oust the Russians from Afghanistan in the 1980s. They and the Army are the only credible political actors in Pakistan today. Even China engages directly with them to protect its infrastructure investments and workers in Pakistan.

Saudi Arabia funds Sunni Iraqi militants to dominate the Shias of Southern Iraq and to undermine Syria’s Shia regime — all because Shias are perceived to be universally aligned with Saudi arch-rival Iran. Conversely, Russia and Iran support Shia militants in Iraq and the Shia regime in Syria. It is not inconceivable that in future Shia militants may be used to neutralise the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Ashraf Ghani — the technocratic President of Afghanistan — would probably welcome a dilution of Taliban power so that he can get on with implementing the development agenda.

Endemic warlordism and militant factionalism in North Africa and West Asia was constrained during the Cold War (1960-1990) by authoritarian regimes supported either by the US or the Soviets. Ironically both the democratic US and the Communist Soviet Union had no qualms about imposing authoritarian regimes as the norm in the region. It helped that till 1990, even the metric of development ignored politics as a factor and focused primarily on enhancing per capita income levels.

Democracy as a metric of development

The change came with the surprisingly sudden collapse of the seemingly well-off Soviet Union, a middle income country in 1990. Soviet unsustainability was ascribed to the absence of Western-style institutions — elective democracy, rule of law, small governments, markets, competition and choice.

Post 2001 (9/11), this development mantra acquired evangelical fervour, as an instrument to “civilise” the “arc of Islamic terror” stretching from Afghanistan in the east, through Egypt and Sudan to Mauritania in western Africa. The Arab Spring (2011) was hailed as the blossoming of democracy in time-warped North Africa. Once invincible, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia bit the dust and the people won. This was the expected upside.

The unintended consequences of Democracy: strengthening traditional fault lines

But two unanticipated downsides were less palatable. First, democracy became uncontainable — like a nuclear explosion. Democratic contagion travelled south and shook the gilded birdcage lives of the Sunni sheikhs of the Gulf states and deposed President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen via tribal bloodletting which rode on the aftershocks of the Tunisian “Jasmine Revolution”.

Second, democracy in Egypt empowered the Muslim Brotherhood — a transnational Islamic party pushed underground by Mr Mubarak. For the G7, “Islamists” ruling Egypt was a horrific replay of the deposition of the “modernist” Shah of Iran in 1979 and the subsequent rise of a “renegade” nuclear, Islamic Iran. The Egyptian “Brothers” — beneficiaries of Islamic democracy — were presented as role models for disenfranchised commoners across the region. This questioning of the elite order was not what the sheikhs or the G7 had bargained for, or desired.

The G7 were comfortable with a “managed democracy” — the bare-bones institutions of a democracy, never mind if the

democratic spirit was non-existent. What they got was an unruly explosion of the democratic spirit — a magnified version of rumbustious, Indian style democracy, where rights trump responsibilities.

Libya disintegrated into armed militias and cost the US the life of its young, well-liked ambassador Chris Stevens. Yemen remains a cauldron of tribal militias. This democratic disorder is much like the persistent clan and tribe-based militancy in Manipur and Nagaland in India’s Northeast, funded by the drugs and arms trade with “wink-nod” support from China.

The recent bomb blast in Tunisia, which killed several British tourists, is similar in intent to the blasts in Mumbai in 1993 and the terror attacks in 2008. The former, managed by smuggler and mafia don Dawood Ibrahim, rode on the back of Muslim anguish at the unlawful destruction of the Babri Masjid by Hindu right-wing groups. The 2008 strike is credited to the Inter-Services Intelligence — Pakistan’s dirty-tricks entity. Both aimed at hitting where it hurts the most — the economy.

Tackle Islamic terror with targeted incentives for peace and development

Can we really expect Indian Muslims to remain unmoved by the global trends in Islamist terror? A few misguided young men have already joined Islamist groups in Iraq and paid the final price. But most Indian Muslims look inwards to a domestic solution to break out of the downward spiral that events drag them into. This is where government intervention can help.

First, reducing poverty helps all marginalized groups. There is a broad congruence between Muslims and poverty in India even today. Focusing on  poverty reduction more vigorously also reverses the marginalization of poor Muslims in Independent India.

Second, a more visible signal is also needed. Positive discrimination like reservations is unhealthy. It pits Muslims against the existing beneficiaries — dalits and backward castes by generating a scrabble for a fixed pie. Far better to instead to empower young Muslims to work productively in the modern economy. Modernizing the curricula of the madrasas is a long-term, sensitive but powerful option. Indian Muslims shine in private enterprises where success is meritocratic and not dependent on connections, networks or preferential access to education or progress at work. They are the core of Bollywood, handicrafts, the arts and our cricket team.  Ashwini Kumar’s Inshallah, Football is a touching film about how a dedicated Brazilian coach uses football leagues to meet the needs of aspirational youth in strife-torn Kashmir. They must be directly supported to do be better prepared for private enterprise which, is in any case, is the growing sector. Indian Muslims must also be assured that being part of the modern economy does not and should not, mean having to abandon traditional beliefs or culture. India is not France. We are a plural society.

Third, politics must lead by example.  Religion is deeply embedded in India. Politics must learn to live with religion as a political force rather than pretend to work within an a-religious framework. In this context, the new government in Jammu and Kashmir which federates the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party of Jammu with the Kashmiri Muslim’s People’s Democratic Party in the governance of the state, is a progressive model which explicitly recognises that religion, like caste, is a legitimate basis for political action. True secularism is recognizing the right of citizens to organize themselves politically on any basis which provides a legitimate common cause.  Better to reflect traditional fault lines honestly rather than paper them over with the Band-Aid of pseudo-secular, socialist gibberish.

Fourth, women are the prime movers of social change, particularly in South Asia. Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Mayawati, the Dalit leader of Uttar Pradesh, and the young Pakistani Nobel Laureate Malala Yousafzai are examples. Leveraging potential Malalas in India via expanded and targeted education and health is what the government should be doing, if one-third of our population — Muslims and Dalits — are to make common cause with the rest of India.

Adapted from the authors column in Asian Age July 2, 2015 http://www.asianage.com/columnists/terror-s-echoes-home-748

Will Ashraf Ghani be Afghanistan’s Manmohan Singh?

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(photocredit: dnaindia.com)

It is unlikely that the national coalition in Afghanistan, which the US has stitched together, will last. More likely, the Unity Government provides a convenient cover of artificially generated “peace” allowing the US to withdraw, with “honour”, from the “graveyard of invaders”.

Once it leaves, the US shall make all efforts to secure a working relationship between the Taliban and the Afghan Unity Government. The US has already started distinguishing between the palatable, if misguided, Taliban, with whom business is possible and the utterly untouchable Al Qaida.

The new Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani seems comfortable with cutting a deal with the Taliban to include them too, in the fullness of time, in the power sharing structure. This approach also fits well with the traditional “big tent” approach of the US which also includes decentralizing power and thereby enhancing inclusion of hitherto marginalized segments. This option is worth a try, but is likely to fail just as surely, as the existing Unity Government.

Mr. Ghani is a knowledgeable, well-meaning and committed, if somewhat unbending, politician-international bureaucrat-academic. His main problem will be similar to what Manmohan Singh faced in India. How does a personally honest leader turn a blind eye to massive corruption and yet retain control over the government?

Mr. Ghani says his first priority will be to make it difficult to be corrupt by improving governance systems. The conundrum is that “power sharing”, almost by definition, means allowing warlords a long rope. Manmohan Singh called it the “dharma of coalition politics”. Once executive control is loosened to avoid the personal association of the leader with the expectedly bad decisions of the warlords, stopping the system from unravelling is tough.

In his last political assignment (2002 to 2004) Mr. Ghani was Finance Minister in Afghanistan and was very successful in introducing some order and economic sense into governance. The parallels are ominous. Mr. Singh too was outstanding as Finance Minister in India before he got the top job. It doesn’t end there. Like Manmohan Singh in 1999, Ashraf Ghani lost his first election in 2009. The question then is: will Mr. Ghani be Afghanistan’s Manmohan Singh; a good man heading a bad outfit? Only time can tell.

For India, the current situation is impossible. There is little to distinguish the Pashtun dominated Taliban from Pakistan’s military de-facto rulers. This is why, traditionally, India cozied up, during the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan (1980s), to the “Northern Alliance” comprising the Hazara, who are determinedly opposed to Pashtun rule; the Tajiks who are today represented by Abdullah Abdullah, the number two leader in the Unity Government and Abdul Rashid Dostum, the indomitable Uzbek leader- who is currently allied with the Pashtun, President-Ashraf Ghani.

Any talk of an Afghan government, propped up by the Taliban, cannot be music to either India’s ears or acceptable to Abdullah Abdullah. This is especially so because China does business with Pakistan quite happily and is unlikely to have any qualms about doing the same with the Taliban. In this calculus any gain for the Taliban, is a gain for Pakistan and for China and a loss for India.

In the shadows is Putin’s Great Bear which is constantly sniffing about for a pot of honey in the great game. India and the Soviets have a long association of friendship which can become the basis for a coalition of the “underdogs” in Afghanistan. India is also friends with Iran, which it uses to trade with Afghanistan. The Russia, Iran, India (RII) axis will become India’s fallback option if the US continues to duck its responsibilities in South Asia. The result will be the “RII axis” playing “spoilers’ with consequential instability and strife in Afghanistan.

The silver lining is that India’s PM Modi has already signaled a preference for a more positive strategy of alignment with the set of countries which represent the shared ideals of democracy, markets and private sector led equitable growth. This approach advocates caution and restraint in committing our scarce resources to secure our near-abroad, whilst we still face enormous challenges of dealing with domestic infrastructure and poverty.

PM Modi stressed during his recent US visit that there can be no “good terror (read Taliban) and bad terror (read IS and Al Qaida). The networks of terror and the resources available to them are fungible and transmute constantly to escape identification. In simple language, a Leopard cannot change its spots. The only option is to isolate and confine it once it turns man eater.

What is unknown is whether President Obama has his ears tuned to South Asia or will the IS and the Middle East pre-occupations distract him completely. Will he be forced to soften his currently anti-Sunni terror stance by turning a blind eye to the Sunni-Taliban in Afghanistan? Great powers have to choose their battles and prioritise across options.

If the choice is between completely browning-off Saudi Arabia and its cohort of Sunni Middle Eastern countries by pursuing Sunni-Terror doggedly, on the one hand and worrying about how this approach could impact India’s interest, we know which way he will jump; and who can blame him for that.

If India is actually part of the “big boys club” we must mobilize pressure from constituencies who have similar interests in containing terror to force the US to not “step off the plate”. If this fails, as it probably shall, the option is to build a coalition against terror with China, which is similarly affected by it. Testing times loom for India’s diplomats.

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