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Posts tagged ‘Narendra Modi’

The Saffron brotherhood in 2024

Vajpayee funeral

No one knows why Prime Minister Modi chose to walk behind Atal Bihari Vajpayee ji’s funeral cortege till “Smriti Sthal” (the place of remembrances), where India’s top politicians – are usually cremated. Was it to bridge the gap between his actions and the principle of Raj Dharma (ethical rule) enunciated by Atalji in 2002? Was he pre-empting possible attempts by the Congress or the Janata Dal, to appropriate for themselves, the legislative and executive legacy of Atalji – the gentle giant? Or was it merely to hog free public facetime on national TV?

Mind over matter

RSS 2

Truth be told, it matters little. What does matter is the impact the extended visual had, of senior BJP leaders trudging on doggedly, through the muggy heat, for 5 long kilometres and seeming none the worse at the end – including the mildly podgy BJP President, Amit Shah. There could be no better illustration of the core RSS ideology of “character building” – training the body through renunciation to execute plans thought up by a selfless mind.

Walter Anderson & Shridhar Damle, the authors of “The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu Revivalism”, 1987 did a comprehensive review and ideology of the RSS at a time when the Sangh dominated the BJP.

The BJP demerged from the Janata Party in 1980. It won its first state level general election with a clear majority, only a decade later, in 1990 in Himachal Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, quickly followed by Uttar Pradesh in 1991 and Rajasthan in 1993. At the national level its seats in the Lok Sabha increased from just 2 in 1987 to 120 in 1991 – far from a majority but it was the second largest party behind the Congress.

RSS/BJP rapid growth and Muslim appeasement

Its spectacular success was partly sparked by a tactical error by Rajiv Gandhi, as Prime Minister, in stoking a Hindu backlash by intervening legislatively in 1986, to reverse the progressive judgement of the Supreme Court in 1985 under Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, which had upheld the High Court ruling, allowing maintenance to Shahbano – a divorced, Muslim woman, under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, even though her suit was not maintainable under Muslim Personal Law.

To assuage the consequential Hindu backlash against, what was perceived as “appeasement” of Muslim sentiment, the Rajiv Gandhi government opened the locks of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya to allow access to the Hindu idols inside.   L.K. Advani launched his Rath Yatra for completing what Rajiv Gandhi had begun – building a Ram Temple, which led to the 1992 illegal demolition of the Babri Masjid by Hindu fundamentalists, even as the Government of Uttar Pradesh – then under the BJP and the Union government, under Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, turned a Nelsons eye to the proceedings.

Babri

More importantly it legitimated, in Hindu minds, the fundamental RSS opinion that unless Hindus presented a united front, democratic processes would result in a dilution of the Hindu voice in governance of the nation.

Anderson and Damle have now updated their 1987 work and covered the developments within the RSS and its affiliates in a new book –“RSS- A View to the Inside”. It is a great place to start understanding the relationship between the RSS and the BJP.

 Post 2012 shift in power balance from RSS to the BJP

The balance of power between the BJP and the RSS has turned since 1987. Of the over 100 affiliates (36 are listed in the book), BJP is the most significant. With a majority in the Lok Sabha and in state governments covering two thirds of India’s population, the BJP is a dominant national player and a significant voice within the Parivar (family) presided over by the RSS.

The RSS has also grown, particularly post 1990.  Nearly 2 million people are said to participate in more than 60,000 Shakhas (primary groups) which meet daily, weekly or monthly. The elite cadre of the RSS consists of 6000 Pracharaks (communicators). These can be functionally likened to the Weberian “steel frame” of the Union government. Unlike them, Pracharaks are unpaid full-time workers, whose meagre, monkish, needs are reimbursed. One half of them are on deputation to affiliates including the BJP – many of whose top leaders (like L.K. Advani and Narendra Modi) were Pracharaks. Significantly, Shah is not one of them, though he is a dedicated swayamsevak (selfless-worker).

Can the RSS be insulated from the compulsions of democratic success

If the BJP is re-elected to power in 2019 for the first time there would have been a decade of BJP political rule. Will this create tensions within the RSS, which remains resolute to its core ideology of nationalism, “character building”, evangelical (as in non-threatening) Hindutva and a belief in its higher moral purpose above mere politics? But this is not a red line. Its cadres actively pushed the BJP to power in the 2014 general elections. A similar strategy seems likely in 2019.

A clash of titans by 2024?

Titans

The more the RSS grapples directly with the politics of evangelical Hindutva the less would be its traction with its affiliates, like the Hindu Vishwa Parishad, which practise a fundamentalist form of Hindutva. The enormous addition in the resources available, which comes with political power in India, will enable the BJP to exercise overwhelming financial dominance over the other affiliates. Would the RSS, till now an umbrella organisation, the centrepiece of the “Parivar” retain its pre-eminence? Could it assimilate a “rainbow” of castes, regions and cultures – all of them products of modern India – into its spiritual view of Hindu culture?

Is there a possibility that a decade of BJP rule till 2024 could refocus the polarity around the BJP rather than the RSS, with the umbrella organisation become the cultural affiliate of the BJP?

This is undoubtedly an extreme scenario. First, the RSS is slow to change and prefers wide consensus to top-down decision making. The BJP under Narendra Modi and Amit Shah is the opposite. It moves rapidly and is completely centralised in its decision making. A war of attrition would probably favour the BJP.

Narendra Modi as Sarsangchalak in 2024

Modi RSS

This writer asked Walter Anderson, at his book discussion in the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi yesterday, if he thought that by 2024 Narendra Modi, would recuse himself from active politics and become the Sarsangchalak – the supreme guide and advisor of the RSS – the position held, since 2009, by Mr Mohan Bhagwat and in doing so, merge the two organisations.

Mr. Anderson’s firm response was “No, a Sarsangchalak is always promoted from within the RSS and they despise politics. Mr. Modi would not want it any other way.” So, there you have it from the expert. Best to take his word for it.

Also available at TOI Blogs August 24, 2018 https://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/opinion-india/the-saffron-brotherhood-by-2024/ 

PM Modi’s Foreign Policy “Trilema”

Trilema

(photo credit: http://www.financialexpress.com)

Reposted from Asian Age May 15, 2015 http://www.asianage.com/columnists/modi-s-trilemma-1

India’s bland foreign policy has traditionally been based on the principle of “please all and offend none”. Things changed under Indira Gandhi when we pivoted to the Soviets and teamed up against the “capitalists” in the West. But post-1990, once the Soviet dream evaporated, we reverted to the “offend none” tactic. The UPA years were a continuation of this approach, which suited the soft-spoken, nominal Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

Things have changed since then. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is a muscular, energetic man and wants his foreign policy to reflect that energy and purpose. But he faces the classic problem of managing an “impossible trinity” comprising the US, a weakening Russia and an emerging China, which today attracts allegiance from countries cutting across traditional power blocs.

East Asia, other than Vietnam and Australia, feeds off China’s economic growth. China will likely add $6 trillion of new wealth (GDP increase over 2015) in the period 2015-24 and this is a powerful magnet that dulls the pain of negotiating with China over “disputed territory” in the South and East China Sea.

Similarly, Sub-Saharan Africa increasingly depends on Chinese investment “aid” and mineral export to China. Even Russia prefers to diversify its energy exports away from Europe to China, but not to India or Japan.

China is an immediate neighbour of India. A dispute over border demarcation in the west and east lingers. Neither party is really willing to resolve it because it is convenient for both.

For China, the ongoing border dispute presents it with the opportunity to build roads through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), linking into Karachi on the Arabian Sea and the still-to-be-built Chinese port of Gwadar in Balochistan province, next to the Iranian border.

For India, the border dispute and China’s dodgy moves to build infrastructure through PoK, with the concurrence of Pakistan, is a package problem. It serves to legitimise a tit-for-tat aggressive development of Arunachal Pradesh, a border territory claimed by China. The area has significant hydro potential estimated at around 30 GW and is of strategic importance to safeguard the north-eastern states of India to its south.

It is fashionable to couch India’s need for China in commercial terms — trade and investment. But China is a much more efficient manufacturer than India and hence a trade deficit ($40 billion doubling to $80 billion in three years) is inevitable, with India as the junior exporting partner. Seeking investment from China is one way of plugging the hole created by the trade deficit. But such investment benefits China as much as India.

India’s growth story, whilst not as impressive as China’s, is sufficiently dramatic in these economically hollow times to garner eyeballs. New value creation (cumulative value addition to GDP over 2014 levels) of $1.4 trillion over a decade from now is not a trifle. A share of just 20 per cent (similar to its share today) in India’s new value creation could feed an annual growth of 0.3 per cent for China.

Growing economic ties with India — soon to be the fourth largest economy in the world (after the US, China and Japan) — enhance China’s “strategic prestige”. This is the “pull” factor. There is also a “push factor” which Indian strategists tend to emphasise — China’s paranoia that India may become part of a US effort to encircle China along with Japan. This “fear factor” is over hyped.

China knows well that the Indian psyche favours reconciliation rather than confrontation. India routinely prefers turning a Nelson’s eye to occasional intransigence but abhors subjugating its sovereignty to any foreign influence — a hangover of our colonial mindset. India could never be a link in an American chain to “contain” China.

China is unconcerned about future competition from the US. Over the next 30 years, the US will morph demographically into being dominated by fast-growing Hispanic and African-American communities; an ageing, minority white population; the inherited disadvantage of high wages and even higher citizen expectations; degrading infrastructure and increasing inequality. What this will mean for the “can do” spirit and mojo which defines the US, is unclear.

Despite such uncertainties, the US remains a long-term natural ally of India. Its plural culture, democratic values, federal institutional arrangements, history of innovation and grounded belief in religion and “family first” gels well with India.

A weakening US and a strengthening India make a perfect combination. The combined GDP of the US, India and Japan will be double of China’s GDP in 2024 and their future value addition — a key “convening” factor for attracting allies — will be higher than that of China.

Finally, the significant Indian community and private sector investment in the US and Europe provide a ready base for developing P2P (people to people) and B2B (business to business) contacts.

All this is reflected in the determined efforts of Mr Modi to establish a trade, investment and communication bridgehead with the US, Japan, Germany and Australia.

The traditional third leg of the impossible trinity has been Russia. But the gains from trade or strategic alignment are scarce. A close strategic friendship with Russia elicits no apprehension in Beijing because Russia is today a “toothless bear” plagued by a natural resource-export dependent economy. Russia, ruled by “grasping” oligarchs, has to reform and shed its macho image. Its best bet is to integrate into Europe, where it belongs. Consequently the “real” third leg of the trinity in future is Europe, with Germany and Russia as possible focal points.

Mr Modi’s strategy to navigate the impossible trinity of US, China and Europe-Russia is clear. Engage with the US, Japan and Germany aggressively and integrate into their value chains. Keep expectations low but exchange lofty targets with the Chinese and the Russians. But, most importantly, keep your powder dry and gear up India’s economy, because our best friend is our own strength and resilience.

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