governance, political economy, institutional development and economic regulation

Posts tagged ‘Pakistan’

The Parsi who abducted Jinnah

‘Mr And Mrs Jinnah’: A Tale Of Unrequited Love And Its Aftermath

BOOK REVIEW : Reddy, Sheela. Mr and Mrs Jinnah: The Marriage that Shook India Penguin Random House India, 2017. 464 pp.

Sheela Reddy has a winner in this deftly crafted and diligently researched work on the life and times of Rattanbai Petit Jinnah. But this is not a racy read to be completed on the flight from Mumbai to Delhi. Try it only when you have the time and mindspace for it. There have been other works on the Jinnahs earlier – Khawaja Razi Haider’s Ruttie and Jinnah and Kanji Dwarkadas’s Ruttie Jinnah: The Story of a Great Friendship.

The recent release of the private papers of Padmaja Naidu provided the impetus to revisit Ruttie and her times. The author paints a broad canvas of the life and times of the commercial, professional, political and zamindari elite of the British Raj during the first three decades of the 20th century with the rumblings of guided democracy as a backdrop to profile Ruttie.

Other characters enter through the door opened by her, including Muhammad Ali Jinnah, or “J” as Ruttie called him – a relentless achiever, penniless son of a bankrupt Shia businessman in Karachi, who became the most sought-after barrister in Bombay, a multi-millionaire by the time he was 40 years old; the political leader of Indian Muslims and eventually, Quaid-e-Azam of Pakistan; austere to the point of having cold baths in freezing England and yet a dandy dresser, with an eye for fast cars and a mansion on Mount Pleasant Road, Malabar Hill.

Jinnah Gandhi

JINNAH – Macaulay’s perfect product with GANDHI – wily, veiled Macaulayputra

ruttie

RUTTIE JINNAH – THE PARSI BEAUTY WITHOUT A CAUSE

Ruttie could have passed into the pages of history unnoticed had it not been for two red lines she crossed. First, at a time when caste and religion were impregnable walls for getting married, Ruttie, a Parsi, married Jinnah, a Shia, without her parents’ approval. Even today “Love Jihad” – a Muslim man marrying a non-Muslim woman, remains socially somewhat unacceptable. But in 1918, this was unheard of. Such were the religious rigidities, that even Motilal Nehru, a contemporary, anglicised Kashmiri Pandit barrister from Allahabad, twice president of the Congress, could not stomach his daughter, Nans (later Vijay Laxmi Pandit), marrying a Muslim man she loved. He successfully moved heaven and earth to break up the romance, aided and abetted by Mahatma Gandhi.

THE PULL OF OPPOSITES

For Ruttie, to have followed her heart, without considering the consequences, was typically foolhardy but also exceptionally courageous. Second, characteristically, it was Ruttie who pursued and wooed Jinnah, a regular guest at the Petit mansion, which with its fabulous cuisine and gracious hospitality was a melting pot of high society.

“I abducted him” was Ruttie’s conclusive declaration to the judge hearing the abduction charge lodged by her father against Jinnah, once he came to know of their secret marriage according to Islamic rituals. It is easy to understand why Ruttie desired Jinnah. He was quite simply the most desirable man around, seemingly impervious to the charms of dozens of swooning society damsels, including, rumour has it, Sarojini Naidu. It was a challenge Ruttie could not ignore.

Not so obvious is why Jinnah wanted Ruttie. Salacious rumour, implausibly, insinuated that it was Ruttie’s wealth which attracted Jinnah. The author perceptively suggests that behind his mask of male invincibility lay an insecure man, craving love and affection. Ruttie, a romantic with undentable self-confidence, bravado and panache must have been the perfect blend of strength and womanly caring which Jinnah had never experienced. Their romance was short lived. From the time they got married in 1918 – when Ruttie turned 16, the cold embrace of Jinnah’s austere life began to cool the flames. It was not the age difference which mattered (Jinnah was 24 years older than her).

Jinnah had devoted himself to his work and to politics since 1898 when he first came to Bombay from Karachi. There was never any time for anything outside his professional and political ambitions. For Ruttie, life was meant to be enjoyed, travelling, meeting and making friends, partying and dancing – which Jinnah detested, interspersed with a fierce commitment to social causes and extravagant gestures defying convention, like sitting on Jinnah’s desk with her legs dangling, during business meetings.

The need to shock, to be out of the ordinary, manifested itself in unorthodox behaviour in Ruttie – refusing to courtesy to the Viceroy, instead greeting him with folded hands in the Indian way; venturing out into the Lower Bazaar in Shimla to eat chaat by the roadside, which upper class women of her time never did. Her portrait penned by Lady Reading, the wife of another Viceroy, is tellingly pointed: “Very pretty, a complete minx. She had less on in the daytime than anyone I have ever seen.” Not surprisingly, the marriage quietly unraveled.

NO PLACE FOR WOMEN LEADERS IN POLITICS

Ruttie longed to join Jinnah in his struggle against the British. On one occasion, whilst Jinnah and the Home Rule Leaguers were engaged in a fierce struggle within the Bombay Town Hall to outvote the supporters of Governor Lord Willingdon, who wanted a memorial erected to honour the governor’s services, Ruttie succumbed to her secret desire to directly engage with the massive crowd gathered outside. Climbing atop a soap box, she delivered a rousing speech which had the crowd begging for more.

Such was the tumult they created, that the Commissioner of Police arrived to disperse the crowd. She refused to leave and resolutely stood up to the water cannons which were unleashed on her and the crowd, drenching them completely. Her beauty, now clingingly displayed, her passion and her determination were much praised.

Jinnah never commented on her actions. But Ruttie understood that her place was not to lead but to sit mutely behind Jinnah in public support of him. This continues to be the role for many talented but unfortunate Indian women even today in our patriarchal, gender-biased society. Jinnah was entirely self-centred, craving attention and love, but only on his terms and at his bidding.

INDEPENDENT WOMEN AT A TIME OF INSTITUTIONALISED DEPENDENCE

The more traditional amongst modern Indian women continue to resignedly cater to it. But Ruttie never was a traditional Indian woman. She, more than any other, was what rich, Indian women from anglicised homes were being taught to become by imbibing the “enlightened” European-style education and lifestyle they were exposed to. That hers was the right way was reinforced by the examples of liberated womanhood around Ruttie. Sarojini Naidu, her key confidante and a frequent guest at the Petit Mansion, equally at ease in Gandhiji’s ashram as in Bombay high society, spent more time out of home on lecture circuits and Congress meetings than with her family in Hyderabad. But her good fortune was to find in MG Naidu the perfect, enlightened, supportive husband, gently explaining to their daughter, Padmaja, that her mother had committed to serve the nation, which thereafter became a duty she could not ignore even at the expense of spending less time with the family.

NEVER A FAMILY

A girl child was born to the Jinnahs in 1919, known today as Dina Wadia married to Neville Wadia of the illustrious Mumbai industrial family. But parenthood created no new bonds. Like the other super rich, anglicised Indians of the time, the Jinnahs outsourced care of their child to European nannies and tutors. Jinnah took no interest in her, beyond willingly paying the bills of the nannies. But that was not atypical for the times.

Why Ruttie, who seemingly adored children and lived with a menagerie of pets, took no interest in her child, remains less clear, except if examined through the lens of Ruttie’s all-consuming love for Jinnah, which left no place for any other.

Seeking a stabilising routine, Ruttie emulated her mother and diverted her creative energies into wifely duties, turning Jinnah’s mansion, South Court, into a breathtakingly beautiful home. But she was unable to cope with the loneliness of unrequited love. Jinnah was not given to expressing his emotions. On the contrary, his entire life had been a struggle to master them.

Ruttie, ostracised by the Parsi community, took refuge in dancing, the occult, Theosophy and ultimately drugs. Ironically, Motilal Nehru visited the lonely Ruttie whenever he was in Bombay. Every visit to the miserable Ruttie must have served to reassure him that he had done the right thing in saving his own daughter from crossing the communal divide. By 1928, the couple were ready to part. Jinnah chided himself for marrying a mere child.

THE END

Ruttie felt stifled by the need to keep up the charade of a hollowed-out marriage, which was devouring all aspects of her character except the role she was expected to play. “Try and remember me beloved,” she wrote to Jinnah “…. as the flower you plucked and not the flower you trod upon.” Her letter to Jinnah on separating is a damning indictment of unrequited love. “Darling, I love you. I love you – and had I loved you a little less, I might have remained with you.” Within a year of separating, Ruttie was dead – rumour has it, through an overdose of drugs. She died on her birthday – February 20 – at the age of 29.

LIVING CONTEXTUAL LIVES MATTERS

Born at the dawn of the 20th century, Ruttie exuded the confidence and exuberance of one born to lead. But her gilded life remained imitative, out of context, a parody of an alien culture, lacking in the sense of purpose or deep roots, which are the bedrock of inner peace and happiness.

Rapid urbanisation and the tech explosion in India have spawned similar incentives today to live “out of context”, “over the top” lives, in insulated, comfortable, alien bubbles. But take heed of Ruttie’s lesson – nothing which is out of context is sustainable.

Sheela Reddy’s book is a treasure trove. A must-have for your bookshelf.

Adapted from the authors BOOK REVIEW in Swarajyamag, August 3, 2017 https://swarajyamag.com/magazine/mr-and-mrs-jinnah-a-tale-of-unrequited-love-and-its-aftermath

Some more onions please

Onions comprise less than 1% by value of India’s agricultural production. The average Indian consumes less than 800 grams of the stuff per month. Onion is a seasonal fruit. Supply traditionally dips during July to September as only the stored winter crop, harvested around March, is available for consumption.

No dearth of onions

onions

photo credit: http://www.washingtonpost.com

India is the second largest producer of onions after China. We produce more than we need and export around 10% of production unless weather events adversely impact the crop. This year unseasonal rain, during harvesting, damaged the winter crop.

But demand is inelastic

Demand is relatively inelastic. Why don’t consumers say no when prices increase? First, onions are to palates in the North, Central and Western parts of India, what fish is to Bengal and curry patta and coconut is to the South. Food, chips even Uttapams taste better with onions. Onion, like Garlic, is also valued for its therapeutic value. Second, onions give a big bang for the buck. An average family spends around Rs 100 per month on the stuff. If price doubles, the burden is irksome but not a killer. Just economizing on pre-paid phone calls can make up the difference. But onion is the key savory for low income households.

It’s the politics stupid!

The fuss about onions is more about politics than economics. The political footprint of onions was established in the 1980 elections. Mrs. Indira Gandhi, on her comeback trail, after her post-emergency election debacle, shrewdly used the price rise in onions to drive home how uncaring of the ordinary person and how incompetent, the government of then Prime Minister Chaudhary Charan Singh had become. This clicked. The Congress won 67% of the Lok Sabha seats. In 1998, a sharp price rise in onions, dethroned the BJP government of Chief Minister, Madanlal Khurana in Delhi thereby establishing a new metric for good governance – the price of onions.

Delhi CM Kejriwal fingers the BJP for price rise

Delhi Chief Minister, Arvind Kejriwal has fingered the Union government for failing to control hoarding and speculation leading to the current price rise. Delhi government flooded Delhi markets in mid-August with onions at Rs 30 per kg. It plans to hold the price line just below Rs 40 per kg through public sector retail supply versus a market retail price of Rs 70 to 80 per kg.

Union government on the back foot

But the Union government claims this is too little and too late. More nimble footwork by the state government could have prevented the steep rise in onion prices in Delhi. The Union government had made available a Price Stabilization Fund of Rs 500 crore in April 2015 which state governments could use by contributing an equal amount to buy onions for retail supply at reasonable rates.

On July 2, when wholesale prices were still around Rs 20 per kg in Lasalgaon, Maharashtra-India’s largest onion mandi, the Union government brought onion under the Essential Commodities Act, thereby enabling stock limits to be enforced on wholesale agencies. It also enforced a Minimum Export Price of Rs 30 per kg to discourage exports.

In todays’ intensely adversarial, no-holds-barred competitive politics no government can ignore a public challenge. The traditionally business friendly BJP government, at the center, is particular sensitive when “hoarders” are fingered for the price rise. Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Andhra Pradesh and Punjab- all BJP/allies governed states – account for more than 60% of national onion production.

Grow more onions, reduce trade margins & transaction costs

Per a NCAER 2014 paper selected productivity enhancement can boost roduction. Three big onion producing states- Maharashtra, MP and AP- account for 50% of production but produce less than 17 kilo gram per Hectare against 27 and 21.5 kg/Ha in Gujarat and Punjab respectively. Again all three are ruled by BJP/NDP. Increasing productivity in just these three states can boost production by 20% ensuring sustained exports and no domestic shortages. Doing more on reducing the trade margin (better storage, faster transportation, lower market fees) can also leave more of the money with farmers whilst lowering domestic prices.

Clearly the government needs an effective and transparent mechanism, which provides the right price signals and rationalizes expectations for both farmers and consumers.

Killing export or killing farmers

Increasing the Minimum Export Price, as the government has done again this year, is the standard response. But such intervention in the market, even as it helps consumers by diverting supply to the domestic market, robs farmers of the gains from export. It also disrupts any attempt to develop export markets. Similarly, importing onions to keep consumer price low reduces the incentives for farmers to grow onions.

The fall back-leaky public distribution

But both these options are less intrusive than using the public procurement and subsidized retail supply template used for food grain. Such publicly managed mechanisms are invariably highly inefficient and ineffective with cascading losses in procurement, storage, transportation, distribution and retail sale. Sometimes inept government managed imports flood the market after the seasonal supply dip has passed and just as the new crop arrives- with disastrous impact on farmers’ incomes.

Can private distribution agencies do better?

Why not appoint a private trading agency for marginal but politically sensitive food crops, mandated to import, export or arrange for domestic distribution to balance market led demand and supply and keeping retail prices within a pre-defined retail trading band, which meets the twin needs of both farmers and consumers. This is what the RBI does for our currency to avoid excessive volatility.

Private trading agencies would charge a hefty commission for their services but it would be considerably less than the cost of direct administrative action to purchase, stock and supply onions along the Food Corporation of India model.

Onion diplomacy anyone?

Alternatively, use onions as a vehicle for building bridges with our neighbours – particularly Pakistan, which loves the stuff almost as much Punjabis. Why not negotiate a stand- by, bilateral onion supply agreement to meet onion deficits in either country on preferential terms? A similar arrangement is possible with our larger northern neighbor- China whose onion productivity exceeds ours’s. Onions can add a savory flavor to Track 1.5 – B2B- diplomacy.

Say no to expensive onions

Isn’t it high time the government bit the political bullet and said no to being bullied about the price of onions? They are not a necessity, which the sovereign is obliged to supply. The Jains don’t even touch the stuff.

To show that onions are dispensable, the entire cabinet should voluntarily say no to fresh onions during the lean period. PM Modi could launch a social media campaign to entreat well-off folks to substitute fresh onions with dried ones or switch to other seasonings, during the lean period. This can reduce demand and hence prices for those, to whom onions are the only savory they can afford other than salt and chilies.

The core of sustainable living is to adapt to what is seasonally available locally, rather than store, pack, can or transport food compulsively to cater to a menu plan made universally available but at a high cost to the environment.

Politics trumps economics hands down

But the catch is that Bihar is a big consumer of onions. People are unlikely to be amused if they can’t get their daily fix of onion, before they go to vote in November. This is one election the BJP needs to win. Visible, strong, centrally managed administrative action to lower retail prices is therefore likely to win over better options – after all the metric of good governance has to be met.

Adapted from the authors article in Asian Age August 31, 2015

Well run, PM Modi

modi run

(photo credit: http://www.iosipa.com)

Reposted from the Asian Age May 25. 2015 < http://www.asianage.com/columnists/well-run-modi-690>

Should it worry us that Modi sarkar resembles the Ethiopian Haile Gebrselassie, the greatest long-distance runner ever and not Usain Bolt, the 100-metre thunderbolt from Jamaica?

Not really. The 100-metre dash, whilst spectacular and crowd pulling, is a good tactic for disaster mitigation but disastrous for managing a huge, diversified economy. The marathon analogy suits India better. It is a test of endurance, grit and determination. Outcomes are only visible towards the end of the 42 km race. Those in the lead for the first eight km rarely end up winning.

Other than physical fitness the marathon runner needs a disciplined mind, which restrains the urge to sprint till the last mile whilst maintaining a planned and steady pace all through. Also important is the ability to transcend the near continuous pain and stress, and remain focused on the goal.

Modi sarkar has expectedly followed the epic Bollywood masala — a marathon interspersed with sprints. Citizens have been kept entertained by a blitzkrieg of short-term Bolt spirits to simulate inclusive ascent on a rising elevator of well being, whilst working steadily behind the scenes towards medium-term goals.

The opening of 80 million small bank accounts; the launch of three social protection (pension and insurance) schemes; the attractively packaged, near weekly engagements with foreign governments on their soil and ours; pushing through the border realignment with Bangladesh; the quietening down of tension with China in Arunachal Pradesh; the relatively incident-free border with Pakistan; the warming relationship with Sri Lanka; the race to make India “cough-free” by substituting clean renewables with dirty fossil fuels; the quick response to natural disaster in Nepal and Bihar; the disciplining of the bureaucracy and the Bharatiya Janata Party’s political cadres; effective management of the sensitive relationship between the BJP and its regressive cultural font — the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh; the visible dominance of the Prime Minister’s Office, which had wilted under the previous government; the productive alignments with Didi’s (Mamata Banerjee) government in West Bengal; Mufti Muhammad Sayeed’s People’s Democratic Party in Kashmir; the Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh; Amma (J. Jayalalithaa) in Tamil Nadu, are all signals of aggressive political outreach.

But behind the scenes, several half-marathons have also been initiated — the blistering pace of tendering and award of infrastructure projects with results expected over the next three years; the quick decisions on defence procurements; the swift auction of coal mines to resolve the fuel supply bottlenecks; the opening up of the defence sector to private investment and management; relaxation of foreign direct investment constraints in insurance — both major sources of good jobs and the quiet continuation of the previous government’s Aadhaar electronic platform as a primary mechanism for verifying identity so necessary for subsidy reform via direct cash transfers.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has run the first leg of the marathon with exceptional skill. But this was the easy part. The next 16 km till 2017 is what will make or break his chances for re-election in 2019. Five key measures stand out.

First, with two big state-level elections coming up, the BJP will need to marry the compulsion for populism with fiscal rectitude, which has been the leitmotif of the first year of Arun Jaitley as the finance minister of India. Reigning in inflation is a continuous struggle in such circumstances. It is fitting that the Reserve Bank of India continues to focus on managing money supply and interest rates. The ministry of finance will have its hands full substituting for the erstwhile Planning Commission in allocation of funds and enhancing real-time, expenditure management systems and metrics to ensure “value for money” spent. Key indicators to watch will be achievement of the targeted reductions in revenue, current account and fiscal deficits.

Second, introduce a poverty and private jobs creation filter. Share the assessments publicly via a “dashboard” of proposed allocations to make the allocation process more transparent and participative. Direct democracy is of Mr Modi’s signature tune. This is also a great way of self-restraining crony capitalism and populism.

Third, cut loose the railways and the public sector companies and banks from the crippling constraints of ministerial intervention. Corporatise all production and service delivery entities as a first step to reform, followed by administrative autonomy and selective listing of stock. The creeping tendency, reminiscent of the “Indira Gandhi ‘commanding heights’ syndrome”, of falling back on the public sector for getting quick results is unfortunate. The international experience shows that poor investments are the outcome if public funds are plentiful. India cannot afford “bridges to nowhere”, even if they create jobs in the short term. This implies fixing the “broken” public-private partnership (PPP) model, not effectively junking it altogether with the government assuming all the risk, as is being considered currently.

Fourth, trim the flabby Union government. The UK model of agencification and administrative reform, tight budget constraints, monetisation of assets and the levy of user charges, fits the Indian context best. Look for “asymmetric reform”, rather than whole-of-government approaches. The Aadhaar unique ID experiment is a useful example of the benefits of strategic, but narrow reform. The “Namami Gange” Clean Ganga Mission is another example. If “cooperative federalism” is to be more than just an attractive slogan the Union government must be the pied-piper, which the state governments follow.

Fifth, fix the big institutional constraints to rapid development. The last thing we need is a clash of titans — Rajya Sabha versus the government — a replay of the dysfunctionality of the American political architecture; judiciary versus the executive. Are we really keen to tread the Pakistan route? Avoid proxy veto by the Union governors over elected state governments — a throwback to the ugly days of the Emergency in the 1970s. Implement the 74th Amendment (1992), which mandates decentralisation but remains ignored two decades later.

The final 16-km dash in 2018 and 2019 will be easy if the half marathons already initiated are run well, over the next two years. The trick is not to sacrifice public interest in an all-out attempt to win state elections in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The question remains: will the BJP’s marathon mind rule or its sprinter’s muscles dominate?

PM Modi’s Foreign Policy “Trilema”

Trilema

(photo credit: http://www.financialexpress.com)

Reposted from Asian Age May 15, 2015 http://www.asianage.com/columnists/modi-s-trilemma-1

India’s bland foreign policy has traditionally been based on the principle of “please all and offend none”. Things changed under Indira Gandhi when we pivoted to the Soviets and teamed up against the “capitalists” in the West. But post-1990, once the Soviet dream evaporated, we reverted to the “offend none” tactic. The UPA years were a continuation of this approach, which suited the soft-spoken, nominal Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

Things have changed since then. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is a muscular, energetic man and wants his foreign policy to reflect that energy and purpose. But he faces the classic problem of managing an “impossible trinity” comprising the US, a weakening Russia and an emerging China, which today attracts allegiance from countries cutting across traditional power blocs.

East Asia, other than Vietnam and Australia, feeds off China’s economic growth. China will likely add $6 trillion of new wealth (GDP increase over 2015) in the period 2015-24 and this is a powerful magnet that dulls the pain of negotiating with China over “disputed territory” in the South and East China Sea.

Similarly, Sub-Saharan Africa increasingly depends on Chinese investment “aid” and mineral export to China. Even Russia prefers to diversify its energy exports away from Europe to China, but not to India or Japan.

China is an immediate neighbour of India. A dispute over border demarcation in the west and east lingers. Neither party is really willing to resolve it because it is convenient for both.

For China, the ongoing border dispute presents it with the opportunity to build roads through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), linking into Karachi on the Arabian Sea and the still-to-be-built Chinese port of Gwadar in Balochistan province, next to the Iranian border.

For India, the border dispute and China’s dodgy moves to build infrastructure through PoK, with the concurrence of Pakistan, is a package problem. It serves to legitimise a tit-for-tat aggressive development of Arunachal Pradesh, a border territory claimed by China. The area has significant hydro potential estimated at around 30 GW and is of strategic importance to safeguard the north-eastern states of India to its south.

It is fashionable to couch India’s need for China in commercial terms — trade and investment. But China is a much more efficient manufacturer than India and hence a trade deficit ($40 billion doubling to $80 billion in three years) is inevitable, with India as the junior exporting partner. Seeking investment from China is one way of plugging the hole created by the trade deficit. But such investment benefits China as much as India.

India’s growth story, whilst not as impressive as China’s, is sufficiently dramatic in these economically hollow times to garner eyeballs. New value creation (cumulative value addition to GDP over 2014 levels) of $1.4 trillion over a decade from now is not a trifle. A share of just 20 per cent (similar to its share today) in India’s new value creation could feed an annual growth of 0.3 per cent for China.

Growing economic ties with India — soon to be the fourth largest economy in the world (after the US, China and Japan) — enhance China’s “strategic prestige”. This is the “pull” factor. There is also a “push factor” which Indian strategists tend to emphasise — China’s paranoia that India may become part of a US effort to encircle China along with Japan. This “fear factor” is over hyped.

China knows well that the Indian psyche favours reconciliation rather than confrontation. India routinely prefers turning a Nelson’s eye to occasional intransigence but abhors subjugating its sovereignty to any foreign influence — a hangover of our colonial mindset. India could never be a link in an American chain to “contain” China.

China is unconcerned about future competition from the US. Over the next 30 years, the US will morph demographically into being dominated by fast-growing Hispanic and African-American communities; an ageing, minority white population; the inherited disadvantage of high wages and even higher citizen expectations; degrading infrastructure and increasing inequality. What this will mean for the “can do” spirit and mojo which defines the US, is unclear.

Despite such uncertainties, the US remains a long-term natural ally of India. Its plural culture, democratic values, federal institutional arrangements, history of innovation and grounded belief in religion and “family first” gels well with India.

A weakening US and a strengthening India make a perfect combination. The combined GDP of the US, India and Japan will be double of China’s GDP in 2024 and their future value addition — a key “convening” factor for attracting allies — will be higher than that of China.

Finally, the significant Indian community and private sector investment in the US and Europe provide a ready base for developing P2P (people to people) and B2B (business to business) contacts.

All this is reflected in the determined efforts of Mr Modi to establish a trade, investment and communication bridgehead with the US, Japan, Germany and Australia.

The traditional third leg of the impossible trinity has been Russia. But the gains from trade or strategic alignment are scarce. A close strategic friendship with Russia elicits no apprehension in Beijing because Russia is today a “toothless bear” plagued by a natural resource-export dependent economy. Russia, ruled by “grasping” oligarchs, has to reform and shed its macho image. Its best bet is to integrate into Europe, where it belongs. Consequently the “real” third leg of the trinity in future is Europe, with Germany and Russia as possible focal points.

Mr Modi’s strategy to navigate the impossible trinity of US, China and Europe-Russia is clear. Engage with the US, Japan and Germany aggressively and integrate into their value chains. Keep expectations low but exchange lofty targets with the Chinese and the Russians. But, most importantly, keep your powder dry and gear up India’s economy, because our best friend is our own strength and resilience.

Will Ashraf Ghani be Afghanistan’s Manmohan Singh?

ashraf

(photocredit: dnaindia.com)

It is unlikely that the national coalition in Afghanistan, which the US has stitched together, will last. More likely, the Unity Government provides a convenient cover of artificially generated “peace” allowing the US to withdraw, with “honour”, from the “graveyard of invaders”.

Once it leaves, the US shall make all efforts to secure a working relationship between the Taliban and the Afghan Unity Government. The US has already started distinguishing between the palatable, if misguided, Taliban, with whom business is possible and the utterly untouchable Al Qaida.

The new Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani seems comfortable with cutting a deal with the Taliban to include them too, in the fullness of time, in the power sharing structure. This approach also fits well with the traditional “big tent” approach of the US which also includes decentralizing power and thereby enhancing inclusion of hitherto marginalized segments. This option is worth a try, but is likely to fail just as surely, as the existing Unity Government.

Mr. Ghani is a knowledgeable, well-meaning and committed, if somewhat unbending, politician-international bureaucrat-academic. His main problem will be similar to what Manmohan Singh faced in India. How does a personally honest leader turn a blind eye to massive corruption and yet retain control over the government?

Mr. Ghani says his first priority will be to make it difficult to be corrupt by improving governance systems. The conundrum is that “power sharing”, almost by definition, means allowing warlords a long rope. Manmohan Singh called it the “dharma of coalition politics”. Once executive control is loosened to avoid the personal association of the leader with the expectedly bad decisions of the warlords, stopping the system from unravelling is tough.

In his last political assignment (2002 to 2004) Mr. Ghani was Finance Minister in Afghanistan and was very successful in introducing some order and economic sense into governance. The parallels are ominous. Mr. Singh too was outstanding as Finance Minister in India before he got the top job. It doesn’t end there. Like Manmohan Singh in 1999, Ashraf Ghani lost his first election in 2009. The question then is: will Mr. Ghani be Afghanistan’s Manmohan Singh; a good man heading a bad outfit? Only time can tell.

For India, the current situation is impossible. There is little to distinguish the Pashtun dominated Taliban from Pakistan’s military de-facto rulers. This is why, traditionally, India cozied up, during the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan (1980s), to the “Northern Alliance” comprising the Hazara, who are determinedly opposed to Pashtun rule; the Tajiks who are today represented by Abdullah Abdullah, the number two leader in the Unity Government and Abdul Rashid Dostum, the indomitable Uzbek leader- who is currently allied with the Pashtun, President-Ashraf Ghani.

Any talk of an Afghan government, propped up by the Taliban, cannot be music to either India’s ears or acceptable to Abdullah Abdullah. This is especially so because China does business with Pakistan quite happily and is unlikely to have any qualms about doing the same with the Taliban. In this calculus any gain for the Taliban, is a gain for Pakistan and for China and a loss for India.

In the shadows is Putin’s Great Bear which is constantly sniffing about for a pot of honey in the great game. India and the Soviets have a long association of friendship which can become the basis for a coalition of the “underdogs” in Afghanistan. India is also friends with Iran, which it uses to trade with Afghanistan. The Russia, Iran, India (RII) axis will become India’s fallback option if the US continues to duck its responsibilities in South Asia. The result will be the “RII axis” playing “spoilers’ with consequential instability and strife in Afghanistan.

The silver lining is that India’s PM Modi has already signaled a preference for a more positive strategy of alignment with the set of countries which represent the shared ideals of democracy, markets and private sector led equitable growth. This approach advocates caution and restraint in committing our scarce resources to secure our near-abroad, whilst we still face enormous challenges of dealing with domestic infrastructure and poverty.

PM Modi stressed during his recent US visit that there can be no “good terror (read Taliban) and bad terror (read IS and Al Qaida). The networks of terror and the resources available to them are fungible and transmute constantly to escape identification. In simple language, a Leopard cannot change its spots. The only option is to isolate and confine it once it turns man eater.

What is unknown is whether President Obama has his ears tuned to South Asia or will the IS and the Middle East pre-occupations distract him completely. Will he be forced to soften his currently anti-Sunni terror stance by turning a blind eye to the Sunni-Taliban in Afghanistan? Great powers have to choose their battles and prioritise across options.

If the choice is between completely browning-off Saudi Arabia and its cohort of Sunni Middle Eastern countries by pursuing Sunni-Terror doggedly, on the one hand and worrying about how this approach could impact India’s interest, we know which way he will jump; and who can blame him for that.

If India is actually part of the “big boys club” we must mobilize pressure from constituencies who have similar interests in containing terror to force the US to not “step off the plate”. If this fails, as it probably shall, the option is to build a coalition against terror with China, which is similarly affected by it. Testing times loom for India’s diplomats.

The MO-XI connect: going beyond the rice bowl.

sabarmati

(photo credit: narendramodi.in)

Later today when the Chinese supremo savours Khakra (a snack) and toasts PM Modi over a glass of aam-ras (the juice of raw mangoes), on the carefully grassed banks of the Sabarmati river, the symbolism of the location will not be lost on him.

What was till recently a sludge filled, trickle, has been transformed into a full water body. What was only a repository of nostalgia is now a kingdom of dreams and hope illustrating that India has shaken-off its somnolence of the past decade and is ready to Samba. The Sabarmati saga shows that we too can execute Chinese style development- large dams like-Narmada, regulating the water supply; city development projects, like the Sabarmati redevelopment scheme and more recently the ambitious Ganga re-development project. All this, in the face of stiff opposition from the usual bug-bears of large development: environmental fundamentalists who, rather academically, advocate strongly against channeling a river, or indeed doing anything which changes its natural flow.

As the bonhomie gets lubricated by Chaas (buttermilk) PM Modi must drive home the point that India has arrived, by politely refusing the expected Chinese offer of US$ 100 billion in financial support (to trump the Japanese offer of US$ 35 billion) for sundry projects. India is not up for sale to the highest bidder. Such bilateral support comes tied with numerous strings including the compulsory use of Chinese contractors. Japanese credit is the same. Whilst the terms of credit are deceptively attractive, there is no open international competition in the award of contracts. This loads the cost of the contract in present value terms far more than the discount on the interest rate offered.

The losers are usually the tax payers of the country providing the credit and the citizens of the country receiving the credit. The first because such “cheap” credit is funded out of the government budget of the donor country. The second because it is the citizens of the recipient country and users of such projects, who will bear the higher lifecycle cost of “gold plated” projects or the supply of low quality and shoddy goods. The winners are industry and business on both sides of the border, who gain by executing such projects. So expect to see an unholy alliance of Chinese and Indian business, loudly applauding the availability of such bilateral credit.

It doesn’t end there. Babus on both sides of the border will also raise a rousing cheer. The sole job and raison d’etre of our Department of Economic Affairs, within the Ministry of Finance, is to “negotiate” such bilateral credit lines. The Chinese (and the Japanese) have counterpart departments negotiating the supply of such credit. So that is another unholy alliance which undermines the financial autonomy of the country.

For many years, our babus have been used to touring the World Capitals with a begging bowl. None of them ever consider how incongruous it looks to assert our rightful place in the UN Security Council on the one hand, whilst simultaneously looking for some “rice” to fill the bowl.

It is time we changed that. The sustainable budget deficit of the Union Government is around US$ 400 billion. A lot of the existing debt is long term and the fiscal space available for new borrowings is limited. We should not fill the narrow window currently available with “nominally cheap but actually expensive” bilateral credit sources. It is just not worth the erosion of our international perception as a resilient stand-alone economy which seeks and gets credit on commercial terms. The key to financial strength is to spend only on projects which have high rates of economic and social returns and to avoid cost overruns. Money well spent is always rewarded by the financial markets through cheaper costs of borrowing.

Getting money cheap and then wasting 25% of it, which is the standard economic loss of non-competitive bids, does not impress financial markets as a viable strategy because it does not enhance our ability to service the credit.

If we need a bullet train or a super highway or high speed tracks linking our Five Big Metros then let us fund them through a mix of foreign commercial credit and foreign direct investment. That is the cheapest finance available today. Both sources also come with strict oversight on expenses and project management.

As the two supremos dip Bhakri (wheat flat bread) into the Kadhi (tangy sauce) Modi should move to the second agenda item and probe the extent to which the Chinese want to collaborate with India in international commercial ventures, in third countries between their companies and our own Navratnas (premier Indian State Owned Enterprises) and Indian private entrepreneurs. Both sides could learn from such collaboration.

Indian business communities in Africa and East Asia are hamstring by the crushing impact of Chinese competition. If collaboration can replace competition, both China and India benefit. After all, the best business venture is a monopoly, like a single toll bridge across a river. We should emulate the developed world, which advocates competition in overseas markets for their goods and services but hang on to quasi monopolies in their own domestic market.

More creatively, can we form an Indo-Chinese multi-national to promote renewable energy internationally? As a tangible target, what about announcing that by 2019, (1) both supremos would switch from the cars they drive in today, to electric cars and (2) their respective official homes and offices in New Delhi and in Beijing would be powered solely by Renewable Energy solutions manufactured through Indo-China cooperation.

As they scoop up the Kansar (a dessert) PM Modi should broach the third pillar of India-China partnership; a gas pipe line running from Turkmenistan/Iran through Pakistan to India and onto Southern China. Gas is critical to India’s energy plans. It is key to improve air quality in urban areas; provide a clean cooking fuel; power our city generators and reduce the incentive to use fire-wood as a fuel in our villages. Of all the commercial fuels, gas and hydro based energy have the most characteristics of a public good. Both generate the least negative externalities in energy supply. On the supply side, Iran is a traditional friend of both India and China. China has an increasingly dominant position in Pakistan which can facilitate safe passage for the pipeline. Their traditional policy of setting up Pakistan as a counter to India is now questionable in the face of Islamic terror and China’s own problems with Islamic communities in their North West. There is a commonality of interest in accessing gas from Iran. It should be pursued boldly using the plurilateral (Iran-Pakistan-India-Bangladesh-China) approach.

Great leaders are those who go beyond the narrow limits drawn by their babuish advisors. PM Modi and President Xi both have the mandate and the time to establish their credentials. They should start by making this point in Delhi.

Spicing the Pak-India “Punjabi Tango” with Gujarati Dandia could yield results.

 

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(Photo credit: outlookindia.com)

The Pak-India affair is almost as tiresome as the Israeli-Palestine impasse.   Neither party can pull apart nor do they live together in peace. Successive governments on both sides start a peace initiative at the beginning of their terms, only to lapse into status-quo near the end-defeated by the inertia of babus and elite interest on both sides.

For most of India, south of the Vindhayas and East of the Yamuna, Pakistan remains a distant and intractable land. For the average Pakistani, India is a bully, growing muscular by the day, bent upon destabilizing Pakistan.

It doesn’t help that for all practical purposes, Pakistanis and North Indians are very alike.  They share the same values and prejudices. The daily “show” of faux aggression at the border post of Attari, near Amritsar, illustrates the brawny culture on both sides. Border guards on both sides face off in a peculiar, mirror image, “Punjabi Tango” of choreographed, muscle and moustache to the accompaniment of lusty words of encouragement of their country people. But the bravado ends tamely, with both sides trotting off to their own quarters, their duty done.

The similarities extend to the mirror, comparative advantages of the two countries; near similar human capital development levels, low income levels and low natural resource endowments. Also similar are the barriers to growth, vast inefficiencies in government and elite capture; by the agro-military-industrial complex in Pakistan and by the agro-industrial elite in India.

Both economies have benefited from adoption of the “open economy” model of growth since the mid 1980s. India more so than Pakistan, which has been constrained over the last two decades by its preoccupation with Afghanistan and its own war on terror-albeit some of it, of its own making. As Bhindrenwale was to Indira Gandhi, the Taliban has become for Pakistan; an out of control Tiger.

The first casualty of insecurity is investment-both public and private-especially in infrastructure. Long payback periods are unsuitably risky if revenue streams become uncertain. More importantly, with the world increasingly in the “open economy’ mode, there are easier business pickings elsewhere. The 21st century belongs to growth in Africa and that is where business is rushing to be, both Indian and Pakistani.

It is not surprising therefore, that trade between Indian and Pakistan is minimal and stagnant, relative to the total trade of both countries. Pakistan exports only 1% of its total goods to India and only 4% of its imported goods are Indian. Of course, the official data underestimates the actual trade through third countries and destinations. Both could benefit by cutting out the intermediaries margin and higher transportation cost of acceptable third party destinations. Non-tariff barriers on both sides; poor trade infrastructure and low financial integration make even the best cross border trade intentions die. Cross border investment is yet to be a reality.

Why then bother at all to disrupt the convoluted stalemate of the past five decades? Here are three good reasons:

First, Pakistan estimates (Economic Survey 2013-14) that it loses up to 3% of its GDP due to insecurity, bleeding it of nearly one half of its potential GDP growth. For India, an insecure Western border is expensive. The geo-politics of Pan-Islamic militancy unsettles its domestic, plural aspirations.

More generally, “including the poor” is a common challenge for both countries. The last thing, either could possibly want, is to add the cost of managing terror to that long list of unproductive, resource draining preoccupations.

Second, India and Pakistan both gain by operationalizing the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. This has been on the agenda for the last two decades and 2018 is the new aggressive target. Both economies are deficient in gas, a clean and versatile fuel for power generation, domestic use and industrial purposes. India loses 0.5% of its GDP every year due to shortage of peaking power capacity. Perversely, domestic coal supply shortages and the high cost of imported coal and LNG keeps installed capacity idle. The TAPI pipeline, would meet around 20% of our gas demand till 2030.

Third, the lack of Pak-India economic integration provides a ready opportunity to China; the “big Panda in the room”, to deepen the economic “silos” with each integrated independently to China, but not to each other. This is already happening. Whilst trade between India and Pakistan stagnates, trade between China and Pakistan is booming, as is trade between China and India.

Of course China is the world’s factory. It aggressively supplies price competitive goods, well suited to the limited pockets of developing countries. Chinese trade comes with generous financial outlays to develop and manage strategic infrastructure; Gwadar Port in Baluchistan (linking the Middle East to China in a trade and energy corridor) and the offer to build high speed railways and highways in India.

Both Pakistan and India will accept much needed foreign capital and investment from anyone who offers it. That is the wise thing to do commercially. But it makes strategic sense to also develop alternative trade and investment opportunities in their “near abroad”. Infrastructure development is a great facilitator for growth. But it also has enduring legacy value. It determines the future spatial spread of growth and jobs along economic corridors. It is sobering to remember that Karachi Port is nearer to Delhi and Amritsar than is Mumbai.

Democracy is great for transparency but is a killer for negotiations, strategic deals and moving on, which are best done in privacy. This is a limitation for PakIndia normalization. The history of distrust and animosity extends far beyond the cricket field. Babu led governments become hostage to the “agency problem”. The narrow self-interest of the managers drowns the real interests of those they represent.

Progress can only come from “disruptive innovation” by leaders. It’s PM Modi’s call. A dash of Gujarati Dandia could spice up the frozen-in-time “Punjabi Tango” to produce results.  

 

Reclaiming a strong India

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What is common between the ongoing events in Crimea (2014), the British action against Argentina in the Falklands under Maggie Thatcher (1982), the war against Tamils in Sri Lanka (1982 to 2009), Kashmir (1947 onwards) and Sikkim (1975)?

All five incidents are text book case studies on the dos and don’ts for the exercise of State power. They illustrate that when the chips are down strong nations protect themselves rather than bank upon the charity of others.

Russia has successfully reversed a partisan decision taken in 1954 to cede Crimea to Ukraine. Possibly, at the time, it was unimaginable that Ukraine could be anything but Soviet territory. Despite threatening noises from Europe and the US, Russia has gone ahead and implemented its decision to reunite Crimea with Russia.

Maggie Thatcher sunk an Argentinian ship in 1982, in a show of jingoistic aggression, to end the armed invasion of the Falklands (population 2300 people located 500 km from the East Coast of Argentina and 13,000 km from the UK) by Argentina. The UK has never needed to assert force ever again. Had they, as a civilized nation, instead requested the UN to get the Argentine army evicted, the Union Jack may have never flown thereafter, in Stanley, the capital of the Falklands.

Sri Lanka bludgeoned the Tamil Tigers and indeed every Tamil in Sri Lanka, into submission with sheer brute force in 2009, thereby resolving the problem of Tamil terrorism at least for the near term. They did this after twenty six years of a low key war of attrition in which they got little support from the World but which sapped the economic growth. Since the war ended in 2009, GDP growth spurted to 8% per annum in 2010 and 2011 and 6% in 2012, despite the adverse international economic environment.

Conversely, half way through the process of evicting the Pakistani intruders in 1947, India approached the UN, to resolve the vexed issue of Pakistan’s illegal capture of around 40% of Kashmir. More than six decades later, Kashmir remains on the boil and absorbs significant fiscal resources and executive time at the expense of the Indian taxpayer. In sharp contrast, India absorbed Sikkim (previously a monarchy) in 1975, based on the demands of democratic reformers in Sikkim. The results of the referendum in favour of joining India are disputed, but Sikkim is today an integral part of democratic India.

The common lesson from all five cases is that governments need strong and specific domestic mandates and collegial decision making, to be decisive in national interest. How can these pre-conditions for strong governments be fostered?

First, despite the happy ending in Sikkim, in matters international, we must not blindly trust our leaders to do the right thing. We need large dollops of sunshine on decision making in international affairs to grow unanimity. This needs to go beyond closed door meetings and briefings of inter-party parliamentary committees. Issues and options need to be debated publicly; risks and rewards assessed objectively and publicly, so that we aam admis also get to know and understand why we are spending the money we are, on securing our interests overseas.

Maybe we do not actually spend enough and more needs to be spent. The point is that currently only a rarified few know what our overseas interests actually are and what we pay to protect them. Even on a “need to know” basis, this charmed circle of foreign policy wonks, diplomats and select politicians needs to be significantly expanded.

Second, vibrant democracies do not survive without a strong sense of nationalism. The World is waiting, with bated breath, for China to fall apart as it becomes more “democratic”. Being nationalistic goes beyond the tokenism of paying respect to the national flag or standing to attention when the national anthem is played. At a very basic level, Nationalism is a warm glow than can be felt, but nor easily measured. It means taking pride in what we have collectively achieved and demonstrating faith that, where we have collectively failed, we can and shall prevail.

These feelings are linked to what an individual considers to be her primary identity. This sense of national identity is very difficult to foster in a culturally heterogeneous country, like ours. Even the mighty Soviet Union failed because it remained, at heart, Russian. India is more fragile than the US, which is at least, bound by English, Coke and McDonalds. We are bound together by “Hindi movies, momos, idlis and butter chicken” but are more like the European Union, without a common language, religion or race to link us.

Like the EU then, we must be bound by strong and mutually beneficial economic ties and a common economic future. Every segment of India must perceive a tangible benefit in remaining Indian, if we are to survive together. Particular attention needs to be paid to the well-being of border areas, which are the most susceptible to dissidence.  

Third, we must reject the mindless enforcement of “National norms” in matters social and cultural. We can learn from the manner in which the Indian joint family has evolved rather than splintered in the face of urban modernity. Today, parents, even the doting, die-hard, joint-family addicts, advise their children to set up a separate kitchen, ideally on the floor above or below them as a second best option for bonding, which is better than a complete split in the family.

In the national context, this means that each segment of society (the intersections of caste, religion, race and region) must get the physical and fiscal space to manage their own affairs and evolve their own individual cultural norms, at their own pace, to cope with the stress of modern life. There can be no single pattern for evolving Indian cultural norms because no such pan-Indian norms exist.

Fourth, we must learn to distinguish between a strong State and a “Big State”. Typically despots run big governments, with large numbers employed in the security establishment, because they manage the State irrespective of the will of the people. Democracies are meant to be aligned to the will of the people and hence can have lean governments.

Large governments can be slimmed down if they choose to decentralize decision making and the use of fiscal resources to user groups. Technology now enables cost effective, real time oversight over decentralized decision making. Red flags and check points can be built into electronic public financial management systems, to avoid misallocation of budgets; budget over-runs or gross mis-procurement.

Growth is slowing down across the World. Countries need to jostle within a limited pie to enlarge their share of economic growth. Only the best shall survive.

India is too large, too heterogeneous and too democratic to escape subtle economic sabotage by competitors. Existing social fissures can be deepened into grand canyons of hate. Such subversion can only be neutralized by the collective will of our citizens. But are we sensitizing our citizens to this risk and to their role in managing it?   

Indian Blood is Expensive

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Indian diplomacy was at its worst last week. It conducted the PMs visit to the US as if he was attending a seminar on economics, in Neemrana. If India is a superpower (perennially waiting to happen), it came across, on the one hand, as a country sapped of all energy and squabbling about petty matters whilst on the other, punching way above its weight (as usual), by seeking to “inform” international debate on marco-economics, political strategy and social development. When will our politicians learn to control their babus egos? International agendas should be set by politicos to project a short, simple and credible message, not waffle on about everything under the Sun.  

Iran, in sharp contrast, showed real leadership and stole the thunder. The freshness of Iran’s approach to international rapprochement and the staleness of India’s squabbling with Pakistan couldn’t have been starker. The Pakistani perception of India and its leaders, aired on Pakistani television as bumbling compromisers, unable to live up to meaningful actions was true, but humiliating.

India used to be a Banyan tree spreading its roots. Today it has become a Baobab tree. Massive from the outside. Hollow from within. This is despite having the best technical talent and intellect in the world. Indians leave India to grow, get respect abroad (like Raghuran Rajan) and only then have the choice to return home to be recognized. The Indian private sector has similar constraints. Indians invest 1 % of GDP abroad (the real figure is higher but the IMF and the GOI do not share with us their assessment of investments abroad using havala) because of the ease in doing business, even in nearby Bangladesh, Myanmar and Srilanka.

Modi spoke on Sunday, from the ramparts of Rohini in Delhi, of “small” nations leaving India behind. It seems he was referring to East Asia, which overtook India in the late 1970s. He could as well have referred to our neighbours in South Asia and Myanmar, who have more recent successes. After Bangladesh, India is the poorest country in this region (World Bank definition of people with income below $2 per day). Srilanka, Nepal and Pakistan all do better than us. Both Srilanka and Bangladesh kept economic growth above 6% in the period 2009-2012 (World Bank Development Data). Even Nepal, managed to keep it above 5%, astoundingly despite (or perhaps because of) an undefined political architecture or credible government. In Pakistan, growth trended upwards from 1.6% in 2008 to 4.2% in 2012. Indian growth meanwhile declined to 3.2% in 2012. The manner in which Srilanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar have shaken off their erstwhile, crabbish lethargy of looking inwards is thrilling for business. We can learn from them.

External and internal conflict is a major growth retardant. The lengthy literature on the negative impact of conflict and violence on social capital and community well-being highlights the importance we need to give to the Rule of Law and Security. Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh has met the extremist challenge upfront. Rajapaksa similarly tamed the Tigers in Srilanka. India’s inability to take strategic and bold steps to root out terrorism is attributed to our being a democracy and hence a soft State.  Nothing could be further from the truth.

If you are poor and marginalized, the Indian state would appear extremely hard and uncaring for your rights. Over 700 million people fall in this category. We are a country still enthralled with inherited social and ritual, class status. In this respect we are very similar to the UK and differ from our true team mate, the US. However, the US acts only in national interest. This is their ethos. You make it or break on your own. If we want to be taken seriously by the US (and the world) we have to first deal with what ails us within.

It is wrong to rush to the US to shake a few limp hands, limply. It is tragic to have leaders who represent no one, or to have those who drive from the back seat. It is unwise to degrade babudom into a quivering jelly of indecision even though we all know that both growth and social inclusion are based on selective but firm and effective state intervention. It is a crime to waste our intellectual and entrepreneurial talent overseas and be poorly served at home. It is unconscionable to spill Indian blood so casually but continue shaking hands with a Pakistani, puppet, Prime Minister. Yes, the nations of the world will applaud this conciliatory, rational approach. But what they respect, is America’s single minded determination to “hunt and gun down” the perpetrators of violence which spilt American blood in America.  Even tiny UK attacked Argentina (admittedly better known for its beef than its military prowess) in a display of the essence of sovereignty; the monopoly of the State over violence within its territory. The world fears China’s single minded, uncompromising pursuit of national interest. If we want to play with the big boys we have to emulate their tactics.

Any poor Indian looking to buy blood for an operation faces prohibitive prices and often scarcity. Why is the blood of our babus in uniform, so cheap then? Let’s value it better.  

 

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